IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.594 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8103/2018)
RASHMI CHOPRA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.598 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8050/2018)
ANITA GANDHI …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.599 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8052/2018)
NAYAN CHOPRA THROUGH POA HOLDER RAJESH CHOPRA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.597 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8042/2018)
AMIT CHOPRA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.596 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8041/2018)
KULDEEP GANDHI …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.595 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8039/2018)
RAJESH CHOPRA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
These appeals have been filed challenging the judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 08.08.2018 by which the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellants praying for quashing the complaint and proceedings in Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015 have been dismissed.
2. All the appeals having been filed against the same judgment, facts of the case are being taken from Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 2019 – Rashmi Chopra & Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., in which criminal appeal, reply affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been filed. The background facts of the case necessary to be noted for deciding these appeals are:-
2.1 Nayan Chopra, son of Rashmi Chopra and Rajesh Chopra got married with Vanshika Bobal, daughter of respondent No.2, Indrajeet Singh on 15.04.2012. All the appellants are family members of Nayan Chopra. Rashmi Chopra is mother, Rajesh Chopra is father, Amit Chopra is Brother and Anita Gandhi is Mother’s Sister of Nayan Chopra, whereas Kuldeep Gandhi is husband of Anita Gandhi. Nayan Chopra with his mother, father and brother are resident of 203, Jainti Apartment, Police Station – Begumpet, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh). Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi are resident of Greater Kailash – I, New Delhi.
2.2 After the marriage of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika, which was performed at Noida, District Gautam Buddha Nagar on 15.04.2012, Vanshika went alongwith her husband at Hyderabad, the matrimonial home of Vanshika. On 28.04.2012, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra left for the U.S.A. On or about November, 2013, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra separated. On 23.10.2014, an application was filed by Nayan Chopra in the Circuit Court for the County of Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan, USA, seeking divorce.
2.3 On 10.11.2014, a complaint was sent by respondent No.2 through registered post to the Superintendent of Police, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Noida making allegations against Rajesh Chopra and two other unknown persons. An application under Section 156(3) was filed by respondent No.2. The application of the respondent No.2 was sent by the Magistrate to Mediation Centre running under the District Legal Services Authority for counselling. After failure of counselling and mediation, an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed by respondent No.2 dated 10.05.2015 making allegations against all the appellants under Section 498A and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2.4 In the complaint, allegations have been made on the basis of incident dated 08.11.2014 against Rajesh Chopra and his associates. It was alleged that Rajesh Chopra call the respondent No.2 near the Gurudwara at Sector 18, Noida to talk about the problem of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika and when respondent No.2 went for talks, he met Rajesh Chopra with two unknown persons. Respondent No.2 further alleges that on his request to accept his daughter, Rajesh Chopra repeated his demand of one crore rupees and used filthy words against Vanshika, which was objected by respondent No.2, on which Rajesh Chopra and his associates became annoyed and they abused and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched his gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The allegations within the meaning of Sections 323, 324, 504, 506, 392 of I.P.C. were made on the basis of the aforesaid incident. In the application, it was also stated that Nayan Chopra has filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in America.
2.5 On the basis of the application of divorce by Nayan Chopra, the Circuit 9th Court for the County of Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan gave a judgment of divorce on 24.02.2016. The order of judgment of divorce was passed after hearing both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal, who were represented through attorneys. The judgment of divorce made provisions for alimony, pension benefits and retirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement and provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims and other provisions.
2.6 The application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No.2 was treated as a complaint and registered as Complaint No. 4967 of 2015, on which the learned Judicial Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued a summoning order on 17.01.2017 summoning the appellants under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2.7 The appellants filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court praying for quashing the complaint and proceedings and order dated 17.01.2017 in Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015. In the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., High Court passed an order referring the matter to mediation centre of Allahabad High Court. The mediation having failed between the parties, application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was heard. The prayer of the appellants to quash the complaint and proceedings have been refused. The application was disposed of after directing that the applicants may surrender in the court below and make an application for bail within a period of two months. Aggrieved against the judgment of the High Court, these appeals have been filed.
3. All appeals arise out of the same order passed in their application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
4. We have heard Shri Shikhil Suri, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned AOR appearing for the respondent No.2. We have also heard learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing the entire complaint proceedings, which proceedings are nothing but abuse of the process of the court. It is submitted that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal had already been granted divorce by Family Court of Michigan, which fact was not brought into notice of the Magistrate by respondent No.2 before summoning order was passed. It is submitted that a reading of the complaint does not prima facie discloses any offence under Section 498A and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants. The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi separately resides and they have never met Vanshika, the girl after marriage. The allegations in the complaint are vague, sweeping and general. The complaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl nor she got her statement recorded in support of the complaint. In so far as incident alleged on 08.11.2014 at Sector 18, Noida no such incident took place and allegations are false and concocted to somehow rope in Rajesh Chopra, the father of the boy Nayan Chopra. The complaint has not been filed by competent person, hence ought not to have been entertained.
6. Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 submits that there is no error in summoning of the appellants by the Magistrate by order dated 17.01.2017. It is well settled that Magistrate is not required to record elaborate reasons for summoning of an accused. The complaint discloses several allegations pertaining to offence under Section 498A and other offences mentioned therein. Two courts having taken one particular view of the matter, this Court may not exercise its jurisdiction in interfering with the orders. It is further submitted that Section 498A does not indicate that complaint on behalf of the women has to be filed by the women herself. The complain was fully competent and no error has been committed by Magistrate in taking cognizance of the complaint.
7. Learned counsel for the parties have placed reliance on various judgments of this Court in support of their submissions, which shall be referred to while considering the submissions in detail.
8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
9. The copy of the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which has been treated as private complaint by Magistrate has been brought on the record as Annexure P-2. The allegations in the complaint are that marriage was solemnised on 15.04.2012 in which marriage, gifts of Rs.50 lakhs were given to Nayan Chopra and his family members. It is alleged that after the marriage, all family members were not satisfied by the gifts and they started harassing the daughter of respondent No.2 by demanding further dowry of one crore rupees. They further pressurised to solemnise the marriage of Vanshika as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies, on which pressure, marriage was solemnised on 06.11.2012 in Gurudwara at Sector 37, Noida as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies. Further allegations are that family members of Nayan Chopra kept on threatening Vanshika to desert her and on 01.12.2013 Nayan Chopra threw Vanshika out of house and since then Vanshika is residing with respondent No.2. Another set of allegations are with regard to incident dated 08.11.2014 alleged to have been taken place at 6.00 PM near the Gurudwara, Sector-18, Noida. It is alleged that Rajesh Chopra, father of Nayan Chopra called the respondent No.2 to talk about their problem on which date Rajesh Chopra again repeated his demand of one crore rupees and used filthy words against Vanshika to which respondent No.2 objected, on which Rajesh Chopra and his associates became annoyed and they abused and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched his gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The above two sets of allegations have given rise to summoning order. The summoning order passed by the Magistrate on 17.01.2017 is as follows:-
“ORDER
The accused persons Nayan Chopra, Rajesh
Chopra, Rashi Chopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep
Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are summoned for the
offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506
of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. The
complainant is directed to take steps as per
Rules within one week. Case is fixed for
08.03.2017 for appearance.
Sd/- illegible
17.01.2017
(Vikas)
Civil Judge (Jr. Division)
J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar.”
10. One of the submissions, which has been pressed by learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is that Magistrate has to be satisfied that there are grounds for proceeding and there is no requirement of giving any elaborate reasons for summoning the accused. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139, this Court in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment laid down following:-
“9. In determining the question whether any
process is to be issued or not, what the
Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether
there is sufficient ground for proceeding and
not whether there is sufficient ground for
conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate
for supporting the conviction, can be
determined only at the trial and not at the
stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the
process to the accused, the Magistrate is not
required to record reasons. This question was
considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control
Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745
and after noticing the law laid down in Kanti
Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (20000 1 SCC
722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749,
para 6)
The legislature has stressed the need
to record reasons in certain
situations such as dismissal of a
complaint without issuing process.
There is no such legal requirement
imposed on a Magistrate for passing
detailed order while issuing summons.
The process issued to accused cannot
be quashed merely on the ground that
the Magistrate had not passed a
speaking order.”
12. Same proposition was reiterated by this Court in Nupur Talwar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465. There can be no dispute to the above proposition as laid down by this Court that while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate is not required to pass a detailed order, however, in a case when Magistrate issues process against a person, who is not even charged with the offence for which he is summoned, whether in such cases also the summoning order cannot be assailed?
13. In the present case, there are two sets of allegations, which are contained in the complaint, which has also been repeated in the statements recorded by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses – PW1 – Raj Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 – Deepa, wife of respondent No.2. One set of allegations of offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act and second set of allegations are allegations made for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C.
14. We may first take up the allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014. It is useful to extract the entire allegations pertaining to incident dated 08.11.2014 from the complaint, which are to the following effect:-
“…………………..On 08.11.2014 at about 6 p.m. Nayan
Chopra’s father Rajesh Chopra called the
Applicant near the Gurudwara at Sector 18,
Noida to talk about their problem. When the
Applicant reached there for talk then he met
there Rajesh Chopra alongwith two unknown
persons. When the Applicant requested Rajesh
Chopra to accept his daughter the Rajesh
Chopra again repeated his demand of one core
Rupees and said that if he has arranged for
one crore Rupees then he can send his
daughter at their home, otherwise keep
Vanshika at his house and Rajesh Chopra used
filthy words against Vanshika, then the
Applicant objected for the same, on which
Rajesh Chopra and his associates became
annoyed and they abused and beat the
Applicant and snatched his gold chain from
his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket.
The wife of the Applicant and a number of
other people gathered at the spot and saved
the Applicant from them. While leaving these
persons threatened the Applicant that after
arranging for one crore Rupees he can send
his daughter at their house, otherwise keep
her at his house and if he dare to inform the
police then they will kill the Applicant and
his daughter Vanshika…….”
15. In the statement made by the complainant in support of his submission, complainant repeated the same allegations regarding incident dated 08.11.2014 as made in the complaint, as noted above. PW-2, Deepa, wife of respondent No.2 has also about the incident dated 08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as narrated in the complaint. A perusal of the allegations in the complaint makes it clear that the complaint with regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been made only against Rajesh Chopra and two unknown persons. Neither in the complaint nor statements made by complainant or his witnesses, there is any allegation with regard to above offences against any other appellants before us. There being no allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 in the complaint or statement before the Magistrate, there was no question of summoning the other appellants for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. When the complaint does not allege any offence against other appellants, we fail to see that how the cognizance of the complaint can be taken against other appellants with regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506. In above view of the matter, the complaint as well as summoning order are liable to be quashed against all the appellants except Rajesh Chopra due to the above reasons in above regard.
16. Now, we come to the allegations in the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. Learned counsel for the respondent in support of his submission that power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised in exceptional circumstances, has relied on judgment of this Court in Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 772. This Court in the above case has relied on an earlier judgment of this Court in Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424, in which judgment, in paragraph No.8 following proposition was laid down, which has been referred to and relied on:-
“8. … At the stage of cognizance and
summoning the Magistrate is required to apply
his judicial mind only with a view to take
cognizance of the offence … to find out
whether a prima facie case has been made out
for summoning the accused persons. At this
stage, the learned Magistrate is not required
to consider the defence version or materials
or arguments nor is he required to evaluate
the merits of the materials or evidence of
the complainant, because the Magistrate must
not undertake the exercise to find out at
this stage whether the materials would lead
to conviction or not.”
17. This Court in Rakhi Mishra’s case has also laid down that High Court in exceptional circumstances can exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima facie case is not made out against the accused. Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:-
“5. The order passed by the trial court
taking cognizance against R-2 and R-4 to R-9
is in conformity with the law laid down in
the above judgment. It is settled law that
the power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised
by the High Court only in exceptional
circumstances only when a prima facie case
is not made out against the accused. The test
applied by this Court for interference at the
initial stage of a prosecution is whether the
uncontroverted allegations prima facie
establish a case.”
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on various judgments of this Court in support of his submissions. In K. Subba Rao and Others Vs. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452, this Court laid down following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-
“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the
supplementary charge-sheet discloses the
fact that the appellants are not the
immediate family members of the third
respondent/husband. They are the maternal
uncles of the third respondent. Except the
bald statement that they supported the third
respondent who was harassing the second
respondent for dowry and that they conspired
with the third respondent for taking away his
child to the U.S.A., nothing else indicating
their involvement in the crime was mentioned.
The appellants approached the High Court when
the investigation was pending. The chargesheet and the supplementary charge-sheet were
filed after disposal of the case by the High
Court.
6. Criminal proceedings are not normally
interdicted by us at the interlocutory stage
unless there is an abuse of the process of a
court. This Court, at the same time, does not
hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of
justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335. The courts should
be careful in proceeding against the distant
relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial
disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of
the husband should not be roped in on the
basis of omnibus allegations unless specific
instances of their involvement in the crime
are made out. See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,
(2000) 5 SCC 207 and Kailash Chandra Agrawal
v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 551”
19. This Court in Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had occasion to examine the parameters of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of quashing of criminal proceeding. One of us (Justice Ashok Bhushan) speaking for the Bench after examining the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. laid down following in Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:-
“22. Before we enter into the facts of the
present case it is necessary to consider the
ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Section
482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section
482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the High
Court to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under this Code,
or to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.
23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated: (SCC p. 703)
“7. … In the exercise of this
wholesome power, the High Court is
entitled to quash a proceeding if it
comes to the conclusion that allowing
the proceeding to continue would be an
abuse of the process of the court or
that the ends of justice require that
the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Court’s
inherent powers, both in civil and
criminal matters, is designed to
achieve a salutary public purpose
which is that a court proceeding ought
not to be permitted to degenerate into
a weapon of harassment or persecution.
In a criminal case, the veiled object
behind a lame prosecution, the very
nature of the material on which the
structure of the prosecution rests and
the like would justify the High Court
in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice. The ends of
justice are higher than the ends of
mere law though justice has got to be
administered according to laws made by
the legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper
realisation of the object and purpose
of the provision which seeks to save
the inherent powers of the High Court
to do justice, between the State and
its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours
of that salient jurisdiction.”
24. The judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in the above case this Court was considering the power of the High Court to quash the entire criminal proceeding including the FIR, the case arose out of an FIR registered under Sections 161, 165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This Court elaborately considered the scope of Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 of the Constitution in the context of quashing the proceedings in criminal investigation. After noticing various earlier pronouncements of this Court, this Court enumerated certain categories of cases by way of illustration where power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or secure the ends of justice.
25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories of cases where power can be exercised under Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows: (Bhajan Lal case, SCC pp. 378-79)
“102. In the backdrop of the
interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise
of the extraordinary power under
Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we
have extracted and reproduced above,
we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either
to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in
the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the
first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of
a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal
bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code
or the Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with
a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
20. After referring to several other cases, this Court concluded and made following observations in Paragraph No. 41:-
“41. Inherent power given to the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose
and object of advancement of justice. In case
solemn process of Court is sought to be
abused by a person with some oblique motive,
the Court has to thwart the attempt at the
very threshold. The Court cannot permit a
prosecution to go on if the case falls in one
of the categories as illustratively
enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal. Judicial process is a solemn
proceeding which cannot be allowed to be
converted into an instrument of operation or
harassment. When there are materials to
indicate that a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive, the High Court will not
hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC to quash the
proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which is to
the following effect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)
“102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal
grudge.”
Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the
facts of the present case. Although, the High
Court has noted the judgment of State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not advert to
the relevant facts of the present case,
materials on which final report was submitted
by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that
the present is a fit case where the High Court
ought to have exercised its jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the
criminal proceedings.”
21. The criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed. This Court has observed that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment. If High Court finds that proceedings deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid down by this Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, High court shall not hesitate in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.
22. Now, we revert back to the allegations made in the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. Few facts have to be noticed before we look into the allegations made in the complaint in the above regard. The complaint has been filed by the respondent No.2 before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar on 10.05.2015, before which date, the petition for divorce has already been filed by Nayan Chopra on 23.10.2014 before the Circuit Court for the County of Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan. It is on the record that at the time of filing of the complaint Vanishka Bobal was living at Canada whereas Nayan Chopra was living at U.S.A. Both were separately living. It was pleaded in the application for divorce that husband and wife had separated on or around November, 2013. It is on the record that on the day criminal complaint was filed on 10.05.2015 in the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar by respondent No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor she was in India at the time when statements were recorded in complaint of complainant as well as his two witnesses. The complaint is not by Vanishka but it has been filed by father of Vanishka, respondent No.2. In the divorce application filed in the State of Michigan, Vanishka Bobal was represented by her attorney. The divorce was granted with orders relating to alimony, pension benefits and retirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement and provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims and other aspects on 24.02.2016.
23. There is nothing on the record to indicate that orders of divorce between the parties was brought into the notice of the Magistrate when he issued process against the appellants. We, however, are in agreement with the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan that decree of divorce between Nayan Chopra and Vanshika shall not wipe out any criminal offence, which has been committed within the meaning of I.P.C. or D.P. Act and the criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has to be examined despite the divorce decree having been granted.
24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.
25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior to filing of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. there was no complaint at any point of time by the girl or her father making allegation of demand of any dowry by any one of the applicants. When both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika started living separately since November, 2013, had there been any dowry demand or harassment the girl would have given complaint to Police or any other authority.
Further, in the divorce proceedings at Michigan, U.S.A., parties have agreed for dividing their properties including gifts given at marriage but no complaint was made in those proceedings regarding harassment by her husband or his family members. The judgment of the divorce contains following clauses regarding “Property Settlement and Provision in Lieu of Dower”:
“PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND PROVISION IN LIEU OF DOWER
1. Each party affirms that he or she fully
and accurately disclosed all the assets owned
by him or her in which he or she has any
interest. By affixing their signatures on
this Judgment, Plaintiff and Defendant affirm
that each has disclosed all assets each owns
or has any interest in, whether held by him
or her individually, by both of them jointly
or with any other person or entity, or by
another person or entity for the benefit of
a party. The property division set forth in
this Judgment of Divorce is intended to be a
distribution and allocation of all the
property of the parties and also is intended
to declare the parties’ property interests
as of entry of this Judgment of Divorce. If
either party has failed, either intentionally
or unintentionally, to disclose any of his
or her assets, the issue of property division
may be reopened on the motion of either party
to determine and resolve the distribution of
any previously undisclosed assets.
2. It appears to the court that the
parties have divided between them to their
mutual satisfaction all articles of personal
property, household furniture and
appliances, cash, savings and checking
accounts and vehicles except as provided
below. The personal property as so divided
shall be the sole and absolute property of
the party in whose possession or under whose
control each of the articles of personal
property are now found and each shall defend
and hold the other harmless from liability
thereon.
a.The parties agree to return all jewelry
to the other party that they currently
have in their possession, which was
acquired as a result of their marriage.
Plaintiff testified that he only had
one item of jewelry and provided the
only jewelry he had in his possession
to Defendant-a single gold ring.
Plaintiff testified she does not have
any jewelry in her possession.
b.The parties agree that their respective
parents will return to the other
party’s parents, all jewelry given as
gifts to their parents and are in their
parent’s possession, which was acquired
by them as a result of the parties’
marriage. The parents agree to exchange
at a mutually agreed upon location and
at a mutually agreed upon time.
3. Except as otherwise provided herein,
each party shall be liable for the debts
incurred by him or her after separation
(11/1/2013) and shall defend and hold the
other harmless from all liability thereon.
4. Except as provide herein, each party
shall be liable for the debts in his or her
name and for the debts associated with
property awarded to him/her pursuant to the
Judgment of Divorce and shall defend and hold
the other harmless from all liability
therein.
5. Except as otherwise provided herein,
each party shall retain all monies in their
respective names, including but not limited
to checking accounts, savings accounts,
certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, IRAs
or 401Ks.
6. There are no joint debts of the parties
except as provided herein.
7. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive
the 2013 Honda CRV free and clear from any
claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA BOBAL, and
the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the
liability thereon and to defend and hold the
Defendant harmless thereon. Defendant shall
transfer title of such vehicles to the
Plaintiff if transferring is needed.
8. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive
the 2005 Toyota Camry free and clear from any
claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA BOBAL, and
the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the
liability thereon and to defend and hold the
Defendant harmless thereon.
9. The provisions for each party herein
made for the parties shall be in lieu of the
dower or spousal right in the lands of the
other and each shall hereafter hold their
remaining lands free, clear and discharged
from any such dower, spousal right and claim
and said provision shall be in full
satisfaction of all claims either may have
in any property which the other owns, or may
hereafter own, in which either has or may
hereafter have an interest.
10. The parties warrant that neither has
incurred any debt in the other party’s name,
or on which the other party may be liable,
which is not expressly disposed of in this
Judgment.
11. This Judgment of Divorce shall
constitute a termination of all rights of a
surviving spouse including, but not limited
to, homestead allowance, election, exempt
property, settlement and family allowance by
each party in the property of the other, and
a termination of all benefits which would
otherwise pass to one party from the other
by testate and intestate, succession or by
virtue of any provision of any will executed
prior to the entry of this Judgment of
Divorce.”
26. The above judgment in divorce proceedings indicates that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled all issues between them including division of properties at the time when divorce proceedings were in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. had been filed making allegation under Section 498A of IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass and put pressure on the applicants.
27. One observation also needs to be made with regard to order passed by the High Court. High Court in its impugned judgment has not referred to allegations made in the complaint except noticing the summoning order has been passed and noticing the principles of law. This Court had occasion to consider a similar order passed by the High Court rejecting the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Jagdish Prasad and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2019) 2 SCC 184. In the said case also under Section 482 Cr.P.C. proceedings, the challenge was made to summoning order as well as entire proceedings of complaint case where allegations under Sections 498A and 323 IPC as well as Section 3/4 of D.P. Act were made. In paragraph No.3, the facts giving rise to filing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court has been noted. This Court made following observations in paragraph Nos.6 to 9:-
“6. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the
case we are inclined to set aside the
impugned order and remand the case to the
High Court for deciding the appellants’
application, out of which this appeal arises,
afresh on merits in accordance with law.
7. On perusal of the impugned order, we find
that the Single Judge has quoted the
principles of law laid down by this Court in
several decisions relating to powers of the
High Court on the issue of interference in
cases filed under Section 482 of the Code
from para 2 to the concluding para but has
not referred to the facts of the case to
appreciate the controversy of the case. We
are, therefore, unable to know the factual
matrix of the case after reading the impugned
judgment except the legal principles laid
down by this Court in several decisions.
8. In our view, the Single Judge ought to
have first set out the brief facts of the
case with a view to understand the factual
matrix and then examined the challenge made
to the proceedings in the light of the
principles of law laid down by this Court
with a view to record the findings on the
grounds urged by the appellants as to whether
any interference therein is called for or
not. We find that the aforementioned exercise
was not done by the High Court while passing
the impugned order.
9. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to
concur with such disposal of the application
by the High Court and feel inclined to set
aside the impugned order and remand the case
to the High Court (Single Judge) with a
request to decide the application afresh on
merits in accordance with law keeping in view
the aforementioned observations. Having
formed an opinion to remand the case in the
light of our reasoning mentioned above, we
do not consider it proper to go into the
merits of the case.”
28. What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7 and
8 of the above judgment is squarely applicable in the
facts of the present case and the order of the High
Court deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.
29. One of the submissions, which has been made by the
learned counsel for the appellant also needs to be
considered. Learned counsel for the appellant had
submitted that complaint has not been filed by a
competent person. It is submitted that complaint is
not made by Vanshika, but has been filed only by father
of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable. The above
submission has been refuted by Shri Santosh Krishnan.
He submits that it is not necessary that a complaint
under Section 498A should be filed only by the victim
of offence. He submits that complaint filed by father
of the victim, respondent No.2 was also fully
maintainable. Section 498A provides as follows:-
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years
and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section,
“cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such
a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life,
limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable
security or is on account of
failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such
demand.”
30. Section 498A provides for an offence when husband or the relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There is nothing in Section 498A, which may indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so subjected. A perusal of Section 498A, as extracted above, indicates that the provision does not contemplate that complaint for offence under Section 498A should be filed only by women, who is subjected to cruelty by husband or his relative. We, thus, are of the view that complaint filed by respondent No.2, the father of Vanshika cannot be said to be not maintainable on this ground. We, thus, reject the submission of the counsel for the appellant that complaint filed by respondent No.2 was not maintainable.
31. In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act is concerned, we are of the view that present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as enumerated by State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) and the High Court erred in refusing to exercise under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We, however, observe that in so far as allegations against Rajesh Chopra pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC is concerned, there were specific allegations, which were also supported by the complainant and his two witnesses in the evidence, at this stage, this Court cannot pronounce as to whether any incident as alleged by the complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or alleged as offence by respondent No.2 or offence as alleged was committed by Rajesh Chopra or not. We, thus, are of the view that insofar as complaint pertaining to offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. against Rajesh Chopra is concerned, said complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated 17.01.2017 is upheld to the above extent only, i.e., summoning of Rajesh Chopra under Sections 323, 504 and 506.
32. In result, (i) Criminal Appeal Nos.594, 598, 599, 597 and 596 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 8103, 8050, 8052, 8042 and 8041 of 2018) are allowed. The complaint as well as summoning order dated 17.01.2017 is set aside insofar as the appellants in the above-mentioned criminal appeals are concerned.
(ii) Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8039 of 2018 – Rajesh Chopra Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.) is partly allowed. The complaint as well as summoning order is set aside insofar as offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act is concerned, however, complaint shall proceed insofar as offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. and summoning order to that extent only is upheld.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
( K.M. JOSEPH )
New Delhi,
April 30, 2019.
