CRM-M-7915-2017 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND
HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-7915-2017
Date of decision: 26.03.2018
Vipin Sharma and others …Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana and another …Respondents
CORAM:- HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE JAISHREE THAKUR
Present:- Mr. Parveen Kaushik, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. P. P. Chahar, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. Azam, Advocate
for respondent No. 2.
JAISHREE THAKUR, J. (Oral)
1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of FIR No. 73 dated 20.07.2016,
registered under Sections 498-A, 377, 406 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code
at Women Police Station, Jhajjar, District Jhajjar (Annexure P-1) and all
subsequent proceedings arising therefrom in view of the compromise
(Annexure P-2) entered into between the parties.
2. In brief, the facts of the case are that the aforesaid FIR came to
be registered at the behest of the complainant/respondent No. 2 in which it
was stated that her marriage was solemnized with Vipin Sharma son of Ram
Vinod Kumar on 17.02.2016. However, she was harassed and maltreated on
account of demand for more dowry at the hands of the petitioners herein and
was also subjected to unnatural sex by her husband. It was in this
background that the aforesaid FIR came to be registered. However, now
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with the intervention of respectable persons, the matrimonial dispute has
been amicably settled between the parties and they have entered into a
compromise. In fact, the parties decided to part ways and a decree of
divorce has now been obtained under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage
Act.
3. By an order dated 09.02.2017, the parties were directed to
appear before the trial Court so that their statement could be recorded
regarding the genuineness of the compromise. The parties appeared before
the JMIC at Jhajjar. In pursuance of the direction, a report has been received
from JMIC at Jhajjar, stating that the compromise arrived at between the
parties is without any pressure or coercion from any one and the same
appears to be genuine one. It is also reported that no PO proceeding is
pending against either of the parties.
4. In normal circumstances, this Court would not entertain a
matter when the non-compoundable offences are heinous and serious in
nature. In the instant case, the offence complained of includes an offence
punishable under Section 377 IPC which is an offence of grave nature. This
Court is aware of the fact that time and again it has been held that an
offence under Section 377 IPC is a grievous offence and thus, such matters
should not be compromised. In the eyes of law, such offence is serious and
non-compoundable and the Courts should not in ordinary circumstances
interfere and quash the FIR that has been registered.
5. In a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, 2014(6) SCC
466, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down certain principles and guidelines
which should be kept in mind while quashing of FIRs pertaining to
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non-compoundable offence. For ready reference paragraphs No. 29.2 and
29.5 are reproduced as under :-
“29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on
that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is
filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure :
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While
exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion
on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would
put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and
extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing
the criminal case.”
6. Even in a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Madan Mohan Abbot vs State Of Punjab, 2008 (4) SCC 582, it has been
held that it is advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a
purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the
compromise even in criminal proceedings. Relevant paragraph of the said
judgment is reproduced herein below :-
“5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the
application was filed in the High Court for quashing of
proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned
order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other
documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal
one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of
extensive business dealings between them and that there
was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of
the allegations made against the accused. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be3 of 5
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CRM-M-7915-2017 -4-served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the
compromise and also in the light of the fact that the
complainant has, on 11th January 2004, passed away and
the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be
ruled out.
6. We need to emphasize that it is perhaps advisable that in
disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal
nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the
compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the
matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the
prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly
overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time
so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and
meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to
the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the
technicalities of the law.”
7. In the judgment rendered in Gian Singh vs State of Punjab
Anr, reported as 2012(10) SCC 303 the basic principle of law as laid down
is that where offences are purely private in nature and do not concern public
policy, the power to quash proceedings involving non-compoundable
offences on the basis of compromise can be exercised.
8. Therefore, while relying upon the ratios of the aforesaid
judgments, this Court is of the view that the compromise which has been
entered into for quashing of the FIR which includes an offence under
Section 377 IPC on the basis of the compromise should be accepted. It is
also relevant to note that a divorce has already been granted and the parties
have moved on. There is also no MLR to substantiate the allegations of
offence punishable under Section 377 IPC. As has been held in Narinder
Singh Ors. case (supra) those cases where a settlement is arrived at
immediately after the alleged commission of the offence, the High Court
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may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings.
Moreover, as per the terms of the compromise, a petition, under Section 13-
B of the Hindu Marriage Act, was filed by the parties for dissolution of their
marriage. This Court is informed that now a decree of divorce has been
obtained by the parties on 16.01.2018 and the marriage stands dissolved. A
certified copy of the said decree of divorce is also placed on record. Since
the marriage has been dissolved subsequent to the compromise, this Court
feels that it would be in the welfare of the parties if the FIR in question is
quashed.
9. Consequently, keeping in view the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case and in view of the above ratios of law, this
petition is allowed and the FIR No. 73 dated 20.07.2016, registered under
Sections 498-A, 377, 406 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code at Women
Police Station, Jhajjar, District Jhajjar (Annexure P-1) and all subsequent
proceedings arising out of the same are quashed qua the petitioners herein.
26.03.2018 (JAISHREE THAKUR)
Waseem Ansari JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No
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