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Supreme Court of India
Ravinder Kumar vs State (Nct Of Delhi) on 6 March, 2024
Author: B.R. Gavai
Bench: B.R. Gavai
2024 INSC 211 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 918 OF 2024
RAVINDER KUMAR … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. This appeal arises against the judgment and order
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at
New Delhi on 12th October, 2015 in Criminal Appeal No.287
of 2015, thereby dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant
herein.
2. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the present
appeal are as under:
2.1 Deceased-Meena, daughter of Mani Ram (PW.3) and
Signature Not VerifiedDigitally signed by
Narendra Prasad
Date: 2024.03.18
12:25:49 IST
Gyanwati (PW.6), got married to the appellant-Ravinder
Reason:Kumar (accused No.1) on 20.06.1999. A male child named
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Harry was born out of the said wedlock on 26.08.2000. On27.04.2001, at 0055 hours, a First Information Report (“FIR”
for short) bearing No.129/2001 (Ext. PW-9/A) was registered
at the instance of deceased-Meena in the Police Station Civil
Lines, Delhi for investigation into the offence under Section
498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short. ‘IPC’). In the
said FIR, deceased-Meena made allegations with regard to
cruelty made by her husband-Ravinder Kumar (accused
No.1) and his two brothers, namely, Pushpender Singh
(accused No.2) and R. Harshinder (accused No.4) during her
stay at the matrimonial home at H.No.252, Old Chandrawal,
Civil Line, Delhi. In the said FIR, after completion of the
investigation a Report under Section 173 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) was submitted.
However, it appears that there was a compromise between
the parties and she made a statement before the
Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court), Delhi that she does
not want to proceed with the case any further. She further
stated that she has no grievance against the accused persons
and that the complaint had been made by her out of
frustration and anger. She had also stated that she was
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living separately with her husband and child happily, as
such criminal proceedings were terminated and the accused
were discharged vide judgment dated 21.10.2003.
2.2 On the morning of 29.05.2004, dead body of Meena was
discovered at about 0820 hours lying in a pool of blood on
the floor of the room on the ground floor, her throat slit with
a sharp edged weapon and her son Harry aged about three
and a half years was found sitting nearby.
2.3 The FIR No.211/04 (Ext. PW-1/A) came to be registered
for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC on the
basis of rukka (Ex.PW-15/B) sent by Sub Inspector Ram
Chander (PW.15). The FIR was later converted into a case
involving for offence punishable under Section 304-B/498-
A/34 of the IPC on the basis of the statements made by Mani
Ram (PW.3), Shiv Kumar (PW.4) and Gyanwati (PW.6), father,
brother and mother of deceased Meena respectively.
2.4 On conclusion of the investigation, charges were framed
against Ravinder Kumar (accused No.1), the husband of the
deceased, Babu Lal (accused No.4), who is the father-in-law
of the deceased, Phoolwati (accused No.3), who is the mother-
in-law of the deceased and Pushpender (accused No.2) and R.
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Harshinder (accused No.5), who are the brothers-in-law of
the deceased. At the conclusion of the trial, by judgment and
order dated 25.11.2014/08.01.2015, the Addl. Sessions
Judge-02, North District, Rohini Courts, Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as “trial court”) convicted the appellant herein for
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced
him to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.25,000/-.
All the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for ten years with fine of Rs.20,000/- for the
offences punishable under Section 304B/34 IPC and rigorous
imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.25,000/- each
for offence under Section 498A/34 IPC with further direction
that in case of default in payment of fine they would undergo
rigorous imprisonment for six months and three months
respectively.
2.5 Being aggrieved thereby, two criminal appeals came to
be preferred by the convicted persons. Mani Ram (PW.3), the
father of the deceased also filed an independent appeal being
Criminal Appeal No.569 of 2015, being aggrieved by the
acquittal of accused Nos.2 to 5 for the offences punishable
under Section 302/34 IPC. The appeals were heard together.
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The High Court, vide impugned judgment and order dated
12th October 2015, held the appellant herein and Pushpender
(accused No.2) guilty for the offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The conviction and
sentence of the appellant herein and Pushpender (accused
No.2) was set aside for the offence punishable under Section
304B read with Section 34 IPC while maintaining the
sentence awarded by the trial court to the appellant for the
offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. The High
Court also sentenced Pushpinder (accused No.2) to undergo
life imprisonment with fine of Rs.25,000/- for the offence
punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. In case of default in
payment of fine, he was directed to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three months. The conviction of Phoolwati
(accused No.3), Babu Lal (accused No.4) and R. Harshinder
(accused No.5) for the offence punishable under Section 304-
B read with Section 34 IPC and conviction of all accused for
offence under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC and
sentences awarded thereagainst were maintained.
2.6 Babu Lal (accused No.4), who is the father-in-law of the
deceased had preferred Criminal Appeal No.2025 of 2017
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before this Court. Since Phoolwati (accused No.3), who is the
mother-in-law of the deceased died during the pendency of
the appeal, the appeal came to be abated against her. In the
said appeal, insofar as Babu Lal (accused No.4) is concerned,
though this Court did not find any ground to interfere with
the conviction passed by the trial court and the High Court,
it reduced the sentence for the period already undergone by
accused No.4-Babu Lal.
2.7 Pushpender (accused No.2) had preferred Criminal
Appeal Nos.938-939 of 2016. This Court, vide order dated
15th February 2022 partly allowed the appeals and set aside
the conviction and sentence recorded against Pushpender
(accused No.2) for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC,
however it restored the conviction and sentence in respect of
offences under Sections 304B and 498A read with Section 34
IPC.
2.8 Insofar as R. Harshinder (accused No.5) is concerned,
he had preferred Criminal Appeal No.244 of 2022. His
appeal was also partly allowed by reducing the sentence to
the period already undergone by him, vide order dated 15th
February 2022.
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2.9 After the aforesaid appeals were decided, the appellant
herein has preferred the present appeal in October, 2023.
Leave was granted in this matter on 13.02.2024.
3. We have heard Ms. Neha Kapoor, learned counsel for
the appellant and Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned
counsel for the respondent.
4. Ms. Kapoor submits that the conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence. She further submits that no
incriminating circumstances have been proved against the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. She submits that
insofar as recovery of the bloodstained clothes is concerned,
it is found at a place accessible to one and all and she
further submits that the recovery panchnama also does not
mention the date of recovery. She therefore submits that, the
conviction under Section 302 IPC is not at all tenable.
5. Ms. Kapoor further submits that even the conviction
under Section 304B and 498A would not be tenable. She
submits that the matter was compromised between the
deceased and the accused. It is submitted that taking into
consideration the above aspect, the amended charge came to
be framed on 14.03.2007, restricting the claim with regard to
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cruelty only for the period between 21.10.2003 and
29.05.2004 i.e. from the date of the discharge by the learned
Magistrate in the earlier proceedings till the date on which
Meena was found dead. Ms. Kapoor further submits that
during this period there is no allegation against the appellant
herein, which would attract the provisions of Section 498A
IPC. It is submitted that the prosecution fails to prove the
guilt. The conviction under Section 304B IPC would also not
be tenable.
6. Shri Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent, on the contrary, submits that
both the Courts, upon correct appreciation of evidence, have
concurrently found the appellant herein guilty for the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC. It is, therefore,
submitted that no interference is warranted with the
conviction recorded under Section 302 IPC. It is submitted
that insofar as conviction under Section 498A and 304B IPC
are concerned, the same has been affirmed by this Court in
the case of three co-accused persons, as such the said
finding has attained finality.
7. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the
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parties, we have scrutinized the evidence.
8. Undoubtedly, the case of the prosecution rests on
circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction
on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been
crystalized in the judgment of this Court in the case of
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1,
wherein this Court held thus:
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by
the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions
on the nature, character and essential proof
required in a criminal case which rests on
circumstantial evidence alone. The most
fundamental and basic decision of this Court is
Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2
SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953
Cri LJ 129] . This case has been uniformly followed
and applied by this Court in a large number of later
decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of
Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969)
3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.
State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972
SC 656] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan,
J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC
71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri
LJ 129] :
“It is well to remember that in cases
where the evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should in the first instance be fully
established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only1(1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121
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with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to
exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words,
there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for a conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and it must
be such as to show that within all human
probability the act must have been done
by the accused.”
153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before
a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:
(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned “must or should” and
not “may be” established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be
proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was
held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC
(Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may
be guilty before a court can convict and
the mental distance between ‘may be’ and
‘must be’ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
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should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the
act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case
based on circumstantial evidence.”
9. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the
prosecution that the circumstances from which the
conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle
that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ guilty
before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that
there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction
between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’.
It has been held that the facts so established should be
consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
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they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held
that the circumstances should be such that they exclude
every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has
been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show
that in all human probabilities the act must have been done
by the accused.
10. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it
may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of
suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is
presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
11. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, we have
examined the present case. In the present case, the trial
court and the High Court have basically convicted and
affirmed the conviction under Section 302 IPC, finding the
plea of the alibi to be without substance. It is a settled
proposition of law that before the burden shifts on the
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accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the
prosecution will have to prove its case. No doubt that in view
of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra2, which is a case
like the present one, where husband and wife reside together
in a house and the crime is committed inside the house, it
will be for the husband to explain how the death occurred in
the house where they cohabited together. However, even in
such a case, the prosecution will have to first establish that
before the death occurred, the deceased and the accused
were seen in the said house. In the present case, the incident
had occurred on the intervening night of 28th/29th May,
2004. It was necessary for the prosecution to lead some
evidence to establish that on the night of 28th/29th May 2004,
deceased and accused were together in the house. This will
be more necessary in view of the specific plea of the defence
of alibi.
12. We will have to consider as to whether the prosecution
has established other circumstances beyond reasonable
doubts, which led to no other conclusion than the guilt of the
2
(2006) 10 SCC 681 : 2006 INSC 691
13
accused.
13. The prosecution has relied upon the CDRs with regard
to mobile phone of the Saroj, Pushpender (accused No.2) and
Ravinder Kumar (accused No.1). However, both the Courts
found the said evidence to be inadmissible as it was not
proved in terms of Section 65A of the Evidence Act. The
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is with regard
to the seizure of the bloodstained clothes allegedly used by
the appellant at the time of commission of the crime beneath
the double bed from his parental home at Chandrawal. We
find that the said recovery cannot be relied for more than one
reasons. For a recovery to be admissible on the statement
made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it has to be from
such a place which is exclusively within the knowledge of the
maker thereof. Indisputably, the recovery is from a place
accessible to one and all and the recovery panchnama also
does not mention the date regarding such a recovery. Apart
from that, there is no entry in malkhana register with regard
to the deposit of the said articles and sending them to the
FSL for chemical examination. We, therefore, find that the
said circumstances cannot be said to be proved beyond
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reasonable doubt.
14. Apart from that, the prosecution has not been in a
position to prove any other circumstance beyond reasonable
doubt. The trial court and the High Court have heavily relied
on the circumstance that an English calendar (Ex. PX) was
found to be hanged in the room. On one side, two sheets of
paper both similar computer print outs has been pasted. On
one of the sheets, on the left top corner, the name Ravinder
followed by mobile telephone number 9818419048 preceded
by a drawing of mobile phone with arrow sign, all written in
hand can be noticed. On the other sheet pasted on the top,
above the calendar, it was printed thus:-
“In-Laws: 2791 3334
Self: 9818419048
My Home: 55153285”
15. It has been held that the appellant had hung calendar
(Ex.PX) on the wall of the house, where he was residing and
the calendar (Ex.PX) would catch the attention of anybody
entering the house. It was held that it was deliberate and
had an objective. It was also held that Chandrawal house
was qualified by the expression “my home” and the house
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where the other phone was functional as that of his “in-
laws”. The High Court observed thus:-
“…The phone number of Chandrawal house was
qualified by the expression “my home” and the
house where the other phone (27913334) was
functional as that of his “In-laws”
16. With this finding and coupled with the finding that in
the house the appellant has created a scene so as to make it
seem like a robbery, it was held that it was only the appellant
who was guilty for commission of murder of his wife.
17. We are of the considered view that the High Court has
failed to draw a distinction between the “may have committed
the crime” or “must have committed the crime”, as held by
this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
(supra). As held by this Court, the suspicion, however strong
it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. We, therefore, find that the prosecution has failed to
prove any incrimination circumstance beyond reasonable
doubt and in any case failed to establish a chain of events
intertwined with each other, which leads to no other
conclusion than the guilt of the accused.
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18. Considering the facts and circumstances, the appeal is
partly allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed
upon the appellant herein for the offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC is set aside. However, the conviction and
sentence in respect of the offences punishable under
Sections 304B, 498A read with Section 34 IPC are restored.
19. In the present case, the appellant has undergone
incarceration for a period of more than fifteen years. In that
view of the matter, we direct that it will not be necessary for
the appellant to deposit the fine amount. The appellant is
directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any
other case.
20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
…………………………J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 06, 2024
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