IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Cr. Misc. No.37156 of 2016
Arising Out of PS.Case No. -231 Year- 2015 Thana -DARBHANGA COMPLAINT CASE District-
DARBHANGA
1. Ram Swarth Sah, Son of Late Babu Lal Sah.
2. Ram Dulari Devi, wife of Ram Swarth Sah.
3. Anil Kumar, Son of Ram Swarth Sah. All Residents of village- Radhaur, Police
Station- Sursand, District- Sitamarhi.
…. …. Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar.
2. Priti Kumari, Wife of Anil Kumar, Daughter of Ghanshyam Purve, Resident of
Village- Basuham, Police Station- Bahera, District- Darbhanga.
…. …. Opposite Party/s
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Jitendra Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Uday Chand Prasad, Adv.
For the State : Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, APP
For the Opposite Party No.2: Mr. Pankaj Kumar Jha, Adv.
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date: 06-09-2017
In the present application preferred under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short „Cr.P.C.‟), the petitioners
have challenged the order dated 21.07.2016 passed by the learned
Sessions Judge, Darbhanga in Cr. Revision No. 193 of 2016 whereby
the revision petition preferred by the petitioners against the order
dated 11.03.2016 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Benipur in Complaint Case No. 231 of 2015
corresponding to Trial No. 587 of 2016 has been dismissed and the
impugned order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate has been upheld.
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2. By the aforestated order dated 11.03.2016, the learned
Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Benipur had summoned the
petitioners in exercise of powers conferred under Section 204 of the
Cr.P.C. after taking cognizance of the offences punishable under
Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short „IPC‟) and
Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1986.
3. The challenge to the order passed by the learned Sub-
Divisional Judicial Magistrate in the revision petition was mainly
based on the ground that having regard to the allegations made in the
complaint, since no part of cause of action had arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Benipur he had no jurisdiction either to inquire into the
matter or to summon the petitioners to hold trial for the offences
under Section 498-A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.
4. Heard Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Advocate for
the petitioners, Mr. Pankaj Kumar Jha, learned Advocate for the
opposite party no.2 and Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, learned Additional
Public Prosecutor for the State.
5. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the petitioners has submitted that as per the complaint
petition the offence alleged took place either in Sitamarhi district or at
the working place of the petitioner no.3 in the district of Purnea. He
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has submitted that no part of cause of action took place within the
territory of Darbhanga district. He has contended that in view of the
allegations made in the complaint, the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and proceed
with the same. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on
the judgments of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Bhura Ram
and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan Anr [(2008) 11 SCC 103], Y.
Abraham Ajith Ors vs Inspector Of Police, Chennai Anr
[(2004) 8 SCC 100] and Amarendu Jyoti Ors. Vs. State of
Chhatisgarh Ors. [(2014) 12 SCC 362].
6. Per contra, Mr. Pankaj Kumar Jha, learned Advocate
for the complainant-opposite party no.2 submits that the opposite
party no.2 has been subjected to cruelty by her husband and his
relatives and in order to save her life she was forced to come to the
house of her parents at Darbhanga.
7. He submits that Section 498-A of the IPC is a
continuing offence. Therefore, the fact that she was driven out of her
matrimonial house because of cruelty meted out to her and had to
take shelter at the house of parents at Darbhanga, the learned Sub-
Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Benipur, Darbhanga was competent to
entertain the complaint in exercise of powers conferred under Section
178(c) of the Cr.P.C. In support of his submission, he has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunita Kumari
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Kashyap Vs. State Of Bihar And Anr [(2011) 11 SCC 301].
8. Mr. Jha submits that Section 498-A of the IPC has
been inserted by Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 and
came into force with effect from 26.12.1983. The Section is the
outcome of pressing need of the society to stop all sorts of cruelty
towards married woman, which had become a problem of the society
He contends that the sole object of Section 498-A of the IPC is to
protect the women from cruelty by her husband or in-laws. He
submits that the complainant was forced to live at her parents‟ house
at Darbhanga, as a result of cruelty meted out to her in her
matrimonial house. Hence, Section 179 of the Cr.P.C. is applicable.
Thus also, the court at Darbhanga has jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint and hold inquiry and try the case.
9. Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor for the State adopts the submissions advanced by the
learned Advocate for the opposite party no.2.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the materials available on record.
11. Some of the provisions of Cr.P.C., which have
bearing on the matter that is being dealt with herein, may be taken
note of. Sections 177, 178 and 179 of the Cr.P.C. read as under :-
“177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.–Every
offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by
a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was
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committed.
178. Place of inquiry or trial.–
(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local
areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local
area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and
continues to be committed in more local areas
than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different
local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a
Court having jurisdiction over any of such local
areas.
179. Offence triable where act is done or
consequence ensues.–When an act is an offence by
reason of anything which has been done and of a
consequence which has ensued, the offence may be
inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction such thing has been done or such
consequence has ensued.”
12. A cursory look at the aforesaid provisions makes it
clear that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a
court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However,
certain exceptions have been carved out. Where an offence is
continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas
than one, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Further, a person accused of
commission of any offence is triable by a court within whose local
limits the act amounting to the offence was committed or the
consequence of that act had ensued.
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13. These are basic rules with regard to jurisdiction of
criminal courts in inquiries and trials in Chapter XIII of the Cr.P.C.
14. In the complaint petition, it is stated that the marriage
ceremony of the complainant with the petitioner no.3 was performed
on 29.11.2012 at Navin Hotel situated in Darbhanga as per Hindu
rites and customs. After marriage she went to her sasural at Sursand,
Sitamarhi where the accused persons, namely, Ram Dulari Devi, Ram
Swarth Sah and Anil Kumar demanded Swift car as dowry. The
complainant told them that the financial condition of her father was
not good and he is unable to fulfill their demand. Thereafter, she was
subjected to immense torture by the accused persons. In the
meantime, her husband was appointed as an Assistant Professor-cum-
Junior Scientist in Bhola Paswan Shastri Agriculture College, Purnea.
It is stated that in April, 2013 she went with her father to Purnea. On
her arrival at Purnea, her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and
brother-in-law (Devar) again started demanding Swift car as dowry.
They confined her in a room and she was not being provided food and
water for days together. Lastly, on 30.12.2013, all the accused
persons ousted her from the house after retaining all her jewellary. At
that time she was pregnant.
15. It is further stated in the complaint that she came
back to Darbhanga. She was blessed with a baby girl on 04.09.2014
in the Nursing Home of Dr. Mina Mahaseth at Darbhanga. It is stated
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that the delay caused in filing the complaint was because her father
was trying to resolve the differences amicably.
16. From a perusal of the complaint petition, it would be
manifest that all alleged acts of demand of dowry or torture had taken
place in the complainant‟s matrimonial house at Sursand, Sitamarhi
or at Purnea where her husband was posted as an Assistant Professor-
cum-Junior Engineer in the College and not at Darbhanga where she
was living together with her parents. There is no allegation in the
complaint that she had been forcibly taken by the accused persons to
her parental house at Darbhanga or while she was residing at
Darbhanga, any demand of dowry was made by the accused persons
or the accused persons came to Darbhanga and subjected her to
cruelty.
17. Having regard to the allegations made in the
complainant, it is to be seen that whether the offence is continuing
one or the “cause of action” ever arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Benipur,
Darbhanga in the light of Sections 178 and 179 of the Cr.P.C.
18. In State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi [(1972) 2 SCC
890], it was observed by the Supreme Court that a continuing offence
is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from
the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those
offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or
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its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which
continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with.
On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance, occurs
and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between
the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission, which
constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which
continues and, therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or
occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence,
there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is
absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or
omission is committed once and for all.
19. The Supreme Court had considered the meaning of the
expression „cause of action‟ in Y. Abraham Ajith Ors vs Inspector
Of Police, Chennai (Supra) as under :-
“13. While in civil cases, normally the expression
“cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated
in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local
jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These
variations in etymological expression do not really
make the position different. The expression “cause of
action” is, therefore, not a stranger to criminal cases.
14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of
bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal
inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it
is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law
applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party
a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must
include some act done by the latter since in the
absence of such an act no cause of action would
possibly accrue or would arise.
15. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a
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judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense
cause of action means the circumstances forming the
infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for
the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary
conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding
including not only the alleged infraction, but also the
infraction coupled with the right itself.
Compendiously the expression means every fact,
which it would be necessary for the complainant to
prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or
grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact,
which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished
from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to
prove such fact, comprises in “cause of action”.
16. The expression “cause of action” has sometimes
been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts
or circumstances which constitute either the
infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a
wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been
used to denote the whole bundle of material facts.
17. The expression “cause of action” is generally
understood to mean a situation or state of facts that
entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a
tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one
or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that
entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from
another person. In Black’s Law Dictionary a “cause of
action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives
rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises
every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must
prove in order to obtain judgment. In Words and
Phrases (4th Edn.), the meaning attributed to the
phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is
existence of those facts, which give a party a right to
judicial interference on his behalf.
18. In Halsbury Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has
been stated as follows:
“Cause of action” has been defined as
meaning simply a factual situation the
existence of which entitles one person to
obtain from the Court a remedy against
another person. The phrase has been held
from earliest time to include every fact which
is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff
to succeed, and every fact which a defendant
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would have a right to traverse. “Cause of
action” has also been taken to mean that
particular act on the part of the defendant
which gives the plaintiff his cause of
complaint, or the subject matter of grievance
founding the action, not merely the technical
cause of action”.
20. The Supreme Court in Y. Abraham Ajith Ors (Supra)
observed thus :-
“11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the
offence was examined by this Court in Sujata
Mukherjee (Smt.) Vs. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee [(1997) 5 SCC 30]. There the allegations
related to commission of alleged offences punishable
under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the
factual background, it was noted that though the
dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the
complainant went to the place where complainant
was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held
in that factual background that clause (c) of Section
178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual
position is different and the complainant herself left
the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of
alleged dowry demands by the husband and his
relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of
allegations about any demand of dowry or
commission of any act constituting an offence much
less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section
178 (c) of the Code relating to continuance of the
offences cannot be applied.”
21. The Supreme Court observed further :-
“19. When the aforesaid legal principles are applied,
to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant
in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion
is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai
and, therefore, the concerned magistrate had no
jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings
are quashed. The complaint be returned to
respondent No.2 who, if she so chooses, may file
the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in
accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly
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allowed.”
22. In Manish Ratan Ors. Vs. State of M.P. Anr.
[(2007) 1 SCC 262], the Supreme Court held that the offence under
Section 498-A of the IPC cannot be held to be continuing one only
because the complainant was forced to leave her matrimonial home. It
allowed the appeal against the order passed by the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in a criminal revision petition whereby the revision
petition questioning the jurisdiction of court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Datia on the touchstone of Sections 177 and 178 of the
Cr.P.C. was dismissed.
23. In Ramesh Vs. State of T.N. [(2005) 3 SCC 507], the
Supreme Court transferred the original case under Section 498-A and
404 IPC from Tiruchirapalli to Chennai observing as under :-
“11. In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for
us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction
of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that
on looking at the complaint at its face value, the
offences alleged cannot be said to have been
committed wholly or partly within the local
jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court at Trichy.
Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the
offence can be said to have occurred within the local
jurisdiction of that Court. Almost all the allegations
pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting
additional property as dowry while she was in the
matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of
misappropriation of her movable property at
Mumbai, However, there is one allegation relevant
to Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that
one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the
said Section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged
that when the relations of the informant met her in-
laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying
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on 13.10.1998, there was again a demand for dowry
and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back
to Mumbai without the money and articles
demanded.
12. Thus the alleged acts which according to the
petitioner constitute the offences under Section 498-
A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in
Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is
nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show
that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at
all committed at Trichy.”
24. In Bhura Ram and Ors. Vs. State Of Rajasthan
(Supra), the case of the complainant was that she left the place where
she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of
Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts, as
per the complaint, had taken place in the State of Punjab. The
complainant had lodged the complaint before the learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganga Nagar against the appellants.
The complaint was sent to the Police Station Sadar Sri Ganga Nagar
for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. pursuant to
which FIR was registered against the appellants for the offences
under Sections 498-A, 406 and 147 of the IPC and charge sheet was
filed against the appellants in the court of Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Sri Ganga Nagar. The learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate framed charges against the appellants for offences
under Sections 498-A and 406 of the IPC. The appellants made a
prayer before the Court that the Court of Additional Chief Judicial
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Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offences as the cause of
action accrued within the jurisdiction of the other court. The
application was rejected. The Revision Petition before the learned
Sessions Judge, Sri Ganga Nagar was also rejected. The High Court
also dismissed the application filed before it against the revisional
order. However, the appeal against the order passed by the High
Court succeeded before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held
that since all the alleged acts, as per the complaint had taken place in
the State of Punjab and, therefore, the court of Sri Ganga Nagar did
not have any jurisdiction to deal with the matter and consequently
quashed the proceeding pending before the court of Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganga Nagar.
25. In Amarendu Jyoti Ors. Vs. State of Chhatisgarh
Ors. (Supra), the appellants had challenged the order passed by the
High Court of Chhatisgarh dismissing their application under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. and holding that the FIR for the offence under
Section 498-A of the IPC was liable to be tried by the court at
Ambikapur, which had jurisdiction to try the offence. The main
contention of the appellants was that the incident of cruelty alleged by
the complainant had taken place only at Delhi, where the couple
resided after which the complainant went to stay with her parents at
Ambikapur in the State of Chhattisgarh, therefore, the Court at
Ambikapur had no jurisdiction to try the offence where no incident
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was alleged to have taken place. This argument did not find favour
with the High Court, which dismissed the application under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. The High Court held that after the complainant had
left the appellants society at Delhi and gone to Ambikapur to reside
with her father, the acts of cruelty continued and, therefore, the
offence of cruelty was a continuing offence.
26. Aggrieved by the rejection of the application by the
High Court, when an appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court,
the main contention on behalf of the appellants was that the FIR did
not disclose a continuing offence. While examining the question
whether the allegations made in the FIR constituted a continuing
offence, the Supreme Court observed as under :-
9. We find from the F.I.R. that all the incidents
alleged by the complainant in respect of the alleged
cruelty are said to have occurred at Delhi. The cruel
and humiliating words spoken to the 2nd
respondent/wife by her husband, elder brother-in-law
and elder sister-in-law for bringing less dowry are
said to have been uttered at Delhi. Allegedly,
arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees in dowry have
been made in Delhi. The incident of beating and
dragging the respondent no. 2 and abusing her in
filthy language also is said to have taken place at
Delhi. Suffice it to say that all overt acts, which are
said to have constituted cruelty, have allegedly taken
place at Delhi.
10. The allegations as to what has happened at
Ambikapur are as follows:
“No purposeful information has been
received from the in-laws of Kiran even on
contacting on telephone till today. They have
been threatened and abused and two years
have been elapsed and the in-laws have not
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shown any interest to call her to her
matrimonial home and since then Kiran is
making her both ends meet in her parental
home. To get rid of the ill-treatment and
harassment of the in-laws of Kiran, the
complainant is praying for registration of an
FIR and request for immediate legal action so
that Kiran may get appropriate justice.”
11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be
said to be a continuing one as contemplated by
Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree
with the High Court that in this case the mental
cruelty inflicted upon the respondent no. 2 “continued
unabated” on account of no effort having been made
by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial
home, and the threats given by the appellants over the
telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High
Court does not make reference to any particular piece
of evidence regarding the threats said to have been
given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus,
going by the complaint, we are of the view that it
cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has
jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate
Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said
offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.”
27. Thus, it would be manifest from the aforesaid
decisions of the Supreme Court that simply because the victim is
compelled to leave her matrimonial house and she takes shelter in her
parental home located in a different city, there would be no
applicability of Sections 178 and 179 of the Cr.P.C. if no part of
“cause of action” has accrued in that city.
28. So far as the decisions of the Supreme Court relied
upon by the learned counsel for the complainant in Sunita Kumari
Kashyap Vs. State Of Bihar and Anr (Supra) is concerned, the brief
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facts of the said case were to the effect that the appellant Sunita
Kumari Kashyap was married to one Sanjay Kumar Saini on
16.04.2000 as per the Hindu rites and ceremonies at Gaya. At the
time of marriage, her father gifted all the household utensils, Almirah,
Double Bed, Dining Table, Fridge, Television and an amount of Rs.
2,50,000/- in cash. However, she was harassed and tortured
immediately after the marriage and an additional demand of 4 lakhs
was made and when she was in family way, she was forcibly taken
out of her matrimonial home at Ranchi and brought to her parental
home at Gaya where she gave birth to a girl child which worsened her
plight. Her husband came up with a new demand that unless her
father gave his house at Gaya to him she will not be taken back to her
matrimonial home at Ranchi.
29. On these allegations, she had lodged the FIR under
Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections
3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act at Magadh Medical College
Police Station, Gaya. After investigation of the case was over and on
perusal of the materials the Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance
under Sections 498-A and 406 read with Section 34 of the IPC and
Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the accused husband
raised objection that the court at Gaya had no territorial jurisdiction.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya rejected the objection.
Against the said order an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
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was filed before the High Court and the High Court took a view that
the proceedings at Gaya were not maintainable for lack of
jurisdiction.
30. On challenge in appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
the order of the High Court holding that there was assertion by the
appellant about the ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of the
husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of
their action, she was taken to her parental home at Gaya by her
husband with a threat of dire consequences for not fulfilling their
demand of dowry, the offence being continuing one having been
committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya,
the learned Magistrate at Gaya will have jurisdiction to try the case
instituted therein.
31. Having considered the facts of the case in Sunita
Kumari Kashyap (Supra), when I look to the facts of the present case,
I find that there is no similarity between the two. In that case the
allegation was that the victim was taken by the husband from Ranchi
to Gaya and was threatened with dire consequences for non-
fulfillment of demand of dowry. There is no such allegation in the
present case. Neither the complainant nor any witness has whispered
that the accused persons took her to Darbhanga or ill-treated her in
any manner at Darbhanga or made any demand of dowry at
Darbhanga.
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32. As noted above, on perusal of the complaint, it is
manifest that all the alleged acts of cruelty had taken place in the
matrimonial house of the complainant at Sursand, Sitamarhi or at the
place of posting of her husband at Purnea where she had come to
reside with him.
33. In view of the discussions made hereinabove as also in
view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhura Ram and
Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan (Supra), Y. Abraham Ajith Ors Vs.
Inspector Of Police, Chennai Anr (Supra) and Amarendu Jyoti
Ors. Vs. State of Chhatisgarh Ors. (Supra), I am of the opinion
that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there would be
no applicability of the provisions prescribed under Section 178(c) or
Section 179 of the Cr.P.C. in the present case.
34. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 21.07.2016
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Darbhanga in Cr. Revision No.
193 of 2016 and the order dated 11.03.2016 passed by the learned
Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Benipur in Complaint Case No.
231 of 2015 corresponding to Trial No. 587 of 2016 are set aside.
35. The application stands allowed.
36. Let the complaint be returned to the complainant and if
she so wishes, she may file the same before the appropriate court to
be dealt with in accordance with law. In case of such filing within
two months from today before the appropriate court, it would not be
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open to the petitioners to challenge the order of cognizance on the
point of lapse of the period of limitation.
(Ashwani Kumar Singh, J)
Pradeep/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE N.A.
Uploading Date 06.09.2017
Transmission 06.09.2017
Date
