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Supreme Court of India

Ravinder Kumar vs State (Nct Of Delhi) on 6 March, 2024

Author: B.R. Gavai

Bench: B.R. Gavai

2024 INSC 211 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 918 OF 2024

RAVINDER KUMAR … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. This appeal arises against the judgment and order

passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at

New Delhi on 12th October, 2015 in Criminal Appeal No.287

of 2015, thereby dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant

herein.

2. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the present

appeal are as under:

2.1 Deceased-Meena, daughter of Mani Ram (PW.3) and
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
Narendra Prasad
Date: 2024.03.18
12:25:49 IST
Gyanwati (PW.6), got married to the appellant-Ravinder
Reason:

Kumar (accused No.1) on 20.06.1999. A male child named

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Harry was born out of the said wedlock on 26.08.2000. On

27.04.2001, at 0055 hours, a First Information Report (“FIR”

for short) bearing No.129/2001 (Ext. PW-9/A) was registered

at the instance of deceased-Meena in the Police Station Civil

Lines, Delhi for investigation into the offence under Section

498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short. ‘IPC’). In the

said FIR, deceased-Meena made allegations with regard to

cruelty made by her husband-Ravinder Kumar (accused

No.1) and his two brothers, namely, Pushpender Singh

(accused No.2) and R. Harshinder (accused No.4) during her

stay at the matrimonial home at H.No.252, Old Chandrawal,

Civil Line, Delhi. In the said FIR, after completion of the

investigation a Report under Section 173 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) was submitted.

However, it appears that there was a compromise between

the parties and she made a statement before the

Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court), Delhi that she does

not want to proceed with the case any further. She further

stated that she has no grievance against the accused persons

and that the complaint had been made by her out of

frustration and anger. She had also stated that she was

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living separately with her husband and child happily, as

such criminal proceedings were terminated and the accused

were discharged vide judgment dated 21.10.2003.

2.2 On the morning of 29.05.2004, dead body of Meena was

discovered at about 0820 hours lying in a pool of blood on

the floor of the room on the ground floor, her throat slit with

a sharp edged weapon and her son Harry aged about three

and a half years was found sitting nearby.

2.3 The FIR No.211/04 (Ext. PW-1/A) came to be registered

for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC on the

basis of rukka (Ex.PW-15/B) sent by Sub Inspector Ram

Chander (PW.15). The FIR was later converted into a case

involving for offence punishable under Section 304-B/498-

A/34 of the IPC on the basis of the statements made by Mani

Ram (PW.3), Shiv Kumar (PW.4) and Gyanwati (PW.6), father,

brother and mother of deceased Meena respectively.

2.4 On conclusion of the investigation, charges were framed

against Ravinder Kumar (accused No.1), the husband of the

deceased, Babu Lal (accused No.4), who is the father-in-law

of the deceased, Phoolwati (accused No.3), who is the mother-

in-law of the deceased and Pushpender (accused No.2) and R.

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Harshinder (accused No.5), who are the brothers-in-law of

the deceased. At the conclusion of the trial, by judgment and

order dated 25.11.2014/08.01.2015, the Addl. Sessions

Judge-02, North District, Rohini Courts, Delhi (hereinafter

referred to as “trial court”) convicted the appellant herein for

the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced

him to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.25,000/-.

All the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for ten years with fine of Rs.20,000/- for the

offences punishable under Section 304B/34 IPC and rigorous

imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.25,000/- each

for offence under Section 498A/34 IPC with further direction

that in case of default in payment of fine they would undergo

rigorous imprisonment for six months and three months

respectively.

2.5 Being aggrieved thereby, two criminal appeals came to

be preferred by the convicted persons. Mani Ram (PW.3), the

father of the deceased also filed an independent appeal being

Criminal Appeal No.569 of 2015, being aggrieved by the

acquittal of accused Nos.2 to 5 for the offences punishable

under Section 302/34 IPC. The appeals were heard together.

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The High Court, vide impugned judgment and order dated

12th October 2015, held the appellant herein and Pushpender

(accused No.2) guilty for the offence punishable under

Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The conviction and

sentence of the appellant herein and Pushpender (accused

No.2) was set aside for the offence punishable under Section

304B read with Section 34 IPC while maintaining the

sentence awarded by the trial court to the appellant for the

offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. The High

Court also sentenced Pushpinder (accused No.2) to undergo

life imprisonment with fine of Rs.25,000/- for the offence

punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. In case of default in

payment of fine, he was directed to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for three months. The conviction of Phoolwati

(accused No.3), Babu Lal (accused No.4) and R. Harshinder

(accused No.5) for the offence punishable under Section 304-

B read with Section 34 IPC and conviction of all accused for

offence under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC and

sentences awarded thereagainst were maintained.

2.6 Babu Lal (accused No.4), who is the father-in-law of the

deceased had preferred Criminal Appeal No.2025 of 2017

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before this Court. Since Phoolwati (accused No.3), who is the

mother-in-law of the deceased died during the pendency of

the appeal, the appeal came to be abated against her. In the

said appeal, insofar as Babu Lal (accused No.4) is concerned,

though this Court did not find any ground to interfere with

the conviction passed by the trial court and the High Court,

it reduced the sentence for the period already undergone by

accused No.4-Babu Lal.

2.7 Pushpender (accused No.2) had preferred Criminal

Appeal Nos.938-939 of 2016. This Court, vide order dated

15th February 2022 partly allowed the appeals and set aside

the conviction and sentence recorded against Pushpender

(accused No.2) for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC,

however it restored the conviction and sentence in respect of

offences under Sections 304B and 498A read with Section 34

IPC.

2.8 Insofar as R. Harshinder (accused No.5) is concerned,

he had preferred Criminal Appeal No.244 of 2022. His

appeal was also partly allowed by reducing the sentence to

the period already undergone by him, vide order dated 15th

February 2022.

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2.9 After the aforesaid appeals were decided, the appellant

herein has preferred the present appeal in October, 2023.

Leave was granted in this matter on 13.02.2024.

3. We have heard Ms. Neha Kapoor, learned counsel for

the appellant and Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned

counsel for the respondent.

4. Ms. Kapoor submits that the conviction is based on

circumstantial evidence. She further submits that no

incriminating circumstances have been proved against the

appellant beyond reasonable doubt. She submits that

insofar as recovery of the bloodstained clothes is concerned,

it is found at a place accessible to one and all and she

further submits that the recovery panchnama also does not

mention the date of recovery. She therefore submits that, the

conviction under Section 302 IPC is not at all tenable.

5. Ms. Kapoor further submits that even the conviction

under Section 304B and 498A would not be tenable. She

submits that the matter was compromised between the

deceased and the accused. It is submitted that taking into

consideration the above aspect, the amended charge came to

be framed on 14.03.2007, restricting the claim with regard to

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cruelty only for the period between 21.10.2003 and

29.05.2004 i.e. from the date of the discharge by the learned

Magistrate in the earlier proceedings till the date on which

Meena was found dead. Ms. Kapoor further submits that

during this period there is no allegation against the appellant

herein, which would attract the provisions of Section 498A

IPC. It is submitted that the prosecution fails to prove the

guilt. The conviction under Section 304B IPC would also not

be tenable.

6. Shri Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned counsel

appearing for the respondent, on the contrary, submits that

both the Courts, upon correct appreciation of evidence, have

concurrently found the appellant herein guilty for the offence

punishable under Section 302 IPC. It is, therefore,

submitted that no interference is warranted with the

conviction recorded under Section 302 IPC. It is submitted

that insofar as conviction under Section 498A and 304B IPC

are concerned, the same has been affirmed by this Court in

the case of three co-accused persons, as such the said

finding has attained finality.

7. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the

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parties, we have scrutinized the evidence.

8. Undoubtedly, the case of the prosecution rests on

circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction

on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been

crystalized in the judgment of this Court in the case of

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1,

wherein this Court held thus:

“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by
the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions
on the nature, character and essential proof
required in a criminal case which rests on
circumstantial evidence alone. The most
fundamental and basic decision of this Court is
Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2
SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953
Cri LJ 129] . This case has been uniformly followed
and applied by this Court in a large number of later
decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of
Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969)
3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.

State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972
SC 656] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan,
J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC
71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri
LJ 129] :

“It is well to remember that in cases
where the evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should in the first instance be fully
established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only

1(1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121

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with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to
exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words,
there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for a conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and it must
be such as to show that within all human
probability the act must have been done
by the accused.”

153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before
a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:

(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned “must or should” and
not “may be” established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be
proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was
held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC
(Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may
be guilty before a court can convict and
the mental distance between ‘may be’ and
‘must be’ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they

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should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the
act must have been done by the accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case
based on circumstantial evidence.”

9. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the

prosecution that the circumstances from which the

conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully

established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle

that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ guilty

before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that

there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction

between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’.

It has been held that the facts so established should be

consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say,

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they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis

except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held

that the circumstances should be such that they exclude

every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has

been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete

as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion

consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show

that in all human probabilities the act must have been done

by the accused.

10. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it

may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable

doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of

suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is

presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

11. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, we have

examined the present case. In the present case, the trial

court and the High Court have basically convicted and

affirmed the conviction under Section 302 IPC, finding the

plea of the alibi to be without substance. It is a settled

proposition of law that before the burden shifts on the

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accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the

prosecution will have to prove its case. No doubt that in view

of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Trimukh

Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra2, which is a case

like the present one, where husband and wife reside together

in a house and the crime is committed inside the house, it

will be for the husband to explain how the death occurred in

the house where they cohabited together. However, even in

such a case, the prosecution will have to first establish that

before the death occurred, the deceased and the accused

were seen in the said house. In the present case, the incident

had occurred on the intervening night of 28th/29th May,

2004. It was necessary for the prosecution to lead some

evidence to establish that on the night of 28th/29th May 2004,

deceased and accused were together in the house. This will

be more necessary in view of the specific plea of the defence

of alibi.

12. We will have to consider as to whether the prosecution

has established other circumstances beyond reasonable

doubts, which led to no other conclusion than the guilt of the

2
(2006) 10 SCC 681 : 2006 INSC 691

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accused.

13. The prosecution has relied upon the CDRs with regard

to mobile phone of the Saroj, Pushpender (accused No.2) and

Ravinder Kumar (accused No.1). However, both the Courts

found the said evidence to be inadmissible as it was not

proved in terms of Section 65A of the Evidence Act. The

circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is with regard

to the seizure of the bloodstained clothes allegedly used by

the appellant at the time of commission of the crime beneath

the double bed from his parental home at Chandrawal. We

find that the said recovery cannot be relied for more than one

reasons. For a recovery to be admissible on the statement

made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it has to be from

such a place which is exclusively within the knowledge of the

maker thereof. Indisputably, the recovery is from a place

accessible to one and all and the recovery panchnama also

does not mention the date regarding such a recovery. Apart

from that, there is no entry in malkhana register with regard

to the deposit of the said articles and sending them to the

FSL for chemical examination. We, therefore, find that the

said circumstances cannot be said to be proved beyond

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reasonable doubt.

14. Apart from that, the prosecution has not been in a

position to prove any other circumstance beyond reasonable

doubt. The trial court and the High Court have heavily relied

on the circumstance that an English calendar (Ex. PX) was

found to be hanged in the room. On one side, two sheets of

paper both similar computer print outs has been pasted. On

one of the sheets, on the left top corner, the name Ravinder

followed by mobile telephone number 9818419048 preceded

by a drawing of mobile phone with arrow sign, all written in

hand can be noticed. On the other sheet pasted on the top,

above the calendar, it was printed thus:-

“In-Laws: 2791 3334
Self: 9818419048
My Home: 55153285”

15. It has been held that the appellant had hung calendar

(Ex.PX) on the wall of the house, where he was residing and

the calendar (Ex.PX) would catch the attention of anybody

entering the house. It was held that it was deliberate and

had an objective. It was also held that Chandrawal house

was qualified by the expression “my home” and the house

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where the other phone was functional as that of his “in-

laws”. The High Court observed thus:-

“…The phone number of Chandrawal house was
qualified by the expression “my home” and the
house where the other phone (27913334) was
functional as that of his “In-laws”

16. With this finding and coupled with the finding that in

the house the appellant has created a scene so as to make it

seem like a robbery, it was held that it was only the appellant

who was guilty for commission of murder of his wife.

17. We are of the considered view that the High Court has

failed to draw a distinction between the “may have committed

the crime” or “must have committed the crime”, as held by

this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda

(supra). As held by this Court, the suspicion, however strong

it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable

doubt. We, therefore, find that the prosecution has failed to

prove any incrimination circumstance beyond reasonable

doubt and in any case failed to establish a chain of events

intertwined with each other, which leads to no other

conclusion than the guilt of the accused.

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18. Considering the facts and circumstances, the appeal is

partly allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed

upon the appellant herein for the offence punishable under

Section 302 IPC is set aside. However, the conviction and

sentence in respect of the offences punishable under

Sections 304B, 498A read with Section 34 IPC are restored.

19. In the present case, the appellant has undergone

incarceration for a period of more than fifteen years. In that

view of the matter, we direct that it will not be necessary for

the appellant to deposit the fine amount. The appellant is

directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any

other case.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

…………………………J.
(B.R. GAVAI)

…………………………J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 06, 2024

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