❖ The senior officers during their visit/ inspections of the
subordinate formations will reiterate the instruction in their
meeting and Sainik Sammelans.

❖ They will review the complaints received by them in their
respective offices.

❖ They will ensure that proper working environment is
provided in their subordinate offices for the women and they
are not discriminated on any point.

13. AWARENESS
❖ Awareness of the right of female employees in this regard
should be created in particular by prominently notifying
and displaying the guidelines at appropriate places.
❖ Women employees should be allowed to raise issues of
sexual harassment at work places through personal
interviews, orderly rooms, welfare meetings, Sainik
Sammelans etc.

Page 59 of 104

15. INTERACTION OF COMMITTEE WITH WOMEN

1. The National Commission for Women has recommended
that Proactive steps such as meeting with women officers
and members of Complaints Committee with all women in
the Force in small groups should be organized. This would
help them to informally exchanging views on handling
sexual harassment related matters and draw mutual
strength. This would build confidence for women to go
forward professionally.

2. Keeping in view of this aspect it has been decided that
henceforth the members of the Frontier level Complaints
Committee will organize the meeting with all women as well
as women employees within their operational jurisdiction of
the Frontier in small groups and exchange their views on
handling sexual harassment related matters as frequently
as possible.

3. The Committee will also include a progress report about the
number of such meetings organized, number of women
present participated points if any, projected and its solution
in the half yearly report to be submitted to Central
Committee Directorate General as per para 7 of above
SOP.

4. The IsG concerned will monitor such visits of the committee
members to ensure positive results.”

40. Rule 3C of the 1964 CCS Rules and the Proviso to Rule 14(2) of the 1965

CCS Rules along with the 2006 Standing Order encompass the entire legislative

scheme for dealing with sexual harassment at workplace in connection with the

Central civil services and posts.

Page 60 of 104

41. The Proviso to Rule 14(2) of the 1965 CCS Rules, provides that in an inquiry

into sexual harassment under the 2006 Standing Order, the general procedure laid

down in the 1965 CCS Rules shall also be applicable as far as practicable. The

Fernandes v. State of Goa and Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 621

wherein it was held that the same is to provide flexibility for achieving a balance

between sensitivity and fairness in an inquiry into sexual harassment. It further

held that while a detour may be made from the CCS Rules however the same must

not be unreasonable. The relevant observations are given below: -

“51. As can be seen from the above, when the misconduct
relates to a complaint of sexual harassment at the work place,
the Complaints Committee constituted by the respondent no. 2-
University to examine such a complaint, dons the mantle of the
inquiring authority and is expected to conduct an inquiry in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in the rules, as far as
may be practicable. The use of the expression “as far as is
practicable” indicates a play in the joints available to the
Complaints Committee to adopt a fair procedure that is feasible
and elastic for conducting an inquiry in a sensitive matter like
sexual harassment at the workplace, without compromising on
the principles of natural justice. Needless to state that the fact
situation in each case will vary and therefore no set standards or
yardstick can be laid down for conducting the inquiry in
complaints of this nature. However, having regard to the serious
ramifications with which the delinquent employee may be visited
at the end of the inquiry, any discordant note or unreasonable
deviation from the settled procedures required to be followed,
would however strike at the core of the principles of natural
justice, notwithstanding the final outcome.”
(Emphasis supplied)

42. It is well settled that when it comes to disciplinary proceedings, it is the

inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority who could be said to be the fact-

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finding authority and the courts in exercise of their powers of judicial review

should not sit in appeal and reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own findings.

The scope of judicial review of the courts is limited only to the propriety of the

decision-making process and the fairness of the inquiry procedure as held by this

The relevant observations are reproduced below:

43. As regards the manner in which the court ought to exercise its powers of

judicial review in matters of disciplinary proceedings particularly one pertaining

to sexual harassment, this Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K.

Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 observed that the courts should not get

swayed by insignificant discrepancies or hyper-technicalities. The allegations must

be appreciated in the background of the entire case, and the courts must be very

cautious before any sympathy or leniency is shown towards the delinquent. It

further held that the courts are obliged to rely on any evidence of the complainant

that inspires confidence. The relevant observations are reproduced below: -

“28. … In a case involving charge of sexual harassment or
attempt to sexually molest, the courts are required to examine the
broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by
insignificant discrepancies or narrow technicalities or the
dictionary meaning of the expression "molestation". They must
examine the entire material to determine the genuineness of the
complaint. The statement of the victim must be appreciated in the
background of the entire case. Where the evidence of the victim
inspires confidence, as is the position in the instant case, the
courts are obliged to rely on it. Such cases are required to be
dealt with great sensitivity. Sympathy in such cases in favour of
the superior officer is wholly misplaced and mercy has no
relevance. The High Court overlooked the ground realities and
ignored the fact that the conduct of the respondent against his
junior female employee, Miss X, was wholly against moral
sanctions, decency and was offensive to her modesty. Reduction
of punishment in a case like this is bound to have demoralising
effect on the women employees and is a retrograde step. There
was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the
punishment imposed by the departmental authorities. The act of
the respondent was unbecoming of good conduct and behaviour
expected from a superior officer and undoubtedly amounted to
sexual harassment of Miss X and the punishment imposed by the
appellant was thus commensurate with the gravity of his

Page 63 of 104
objectionable behaviour and did not warrant any interference by
the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review.
“29. At the conclusion of the hearing, learned counsel for the
respondent submitted that the respondent was repentant of his
actions and that he tenders an unqualified apology and that he
was willing to also go and to apologise to Miss X. We are afraid,
it is too late in the day to show any sympathy to the respondent
in such a case. Any lenient action in such a case is bound to have
demoralising effect on working women. Sympathy in such cases
is uncalled for and mercy is misplaced.”
(Emphasis supplied)

44. Similarly, in Union of India and Others v. Mudrika Singh reported in 2021

SCC OnLine SC 1173, this Court speaking through one of us Dr. D.Y.

Chandrachud, CJI., cautioned the courts from invalidating inquiries into sexual

harassment on specious pleas and hyper-technical interpretations of the service

rules. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder: -

Deeming such a trivial aspect to be of monumental relevance, while
invalidating the entirety of the disciplinary proceedings against the
respondent and reinstating him to his position renders the
complainant's remedy at nought. The history of legal proceedings
such as these is a major factor that contributes to the deterrence
that civil and criminal mechanisms pose to persons aggrieved of
sexual harassment. The High Court, in this case, was not only
incorrect in its interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Commandant
and the obligation of the SSFC to furnish reasons under the BSF
Act 1968 and Rules therein, but also demonstrated a callous attitude
to the gravamen of the proceedings. We implore courts to interpret
service rules and statutory regulations governing the prevention of
sexual harassment at the workplace in a manner that metes out
procedural and substantive justice to all the parties.”
(Emphasis supplied)

E.2 Whether the Central Complaints Committee could have looked into
the second complaint dated 18.09.2012?

45. The High Court in its impugned judgment observed that the Disciplinary

Authority had constituted the Central Complaints Committee on the basis of the

complaint filed by the victim. Since, at the time when the Central Complaints

Committee came to be constituted, there was only one complaint i.e., the

complainant’s first complaint dated 30.08.2011, it necessarily meant that the

Central Complaints Committee was mandated and empowered to inquire into only

that complaint to which the committee owed its existence or in other words, the

complaint that was before the Disciplinary Authority which led the authority to

take the decision of constituting the Central Complaints Committee in the first

place.

46. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the 2006 Standing Order

more particularly Clause 10(i), which prescribes the first step for making a
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complaint of sexual harassment and provides how the complaint and redressal

mechanism for sexual harassment is set-into motion. The said provision is being

reproduced below: -

“10. COMPLAINT MECHANISM

i) Any person aggrieved shall prefer a complaint before the
Complaints Committee at the earliest point of time.”

47. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision makes it abundantly clear

that the complaint mechanism begins with a complaint being made to the

“complaints committee” and as such any inquiry into the complaint of sexual

harassment under Rule 14 of the 1965 CCS Rules read with the 2006 Standing

Order begins the moment any complaint is made to a complaints committee

specified in Clause 9, be it a Frontier Complaints Committee or a Central

Complaints Committee.

48. The use of the words “Any person aggrieved shall prefer a complaint before

the Complaints Committee at the earliest point of time” connotes two pertinent

aspects; (i) first, that the word “prefer” stipulates that the said provision is an

enabling provision that permits a person from making a complaint of sexual

harassment directly to the complaints committee which is the designated

committee for looking into such complaints and (ii) secondly, the said provision

contains nothing which could be construed to inhibit the filing of a subsequent or

additional complaint before the complaints committee.

Page 66 of 104

49. What emerges from the aforesaid is that irrespective of whether a prior

complaint had already been made to any authority, a complaint regarding sexual

harassment could be made under Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order to the

complaints committee as-well. Whether the additional or second complaint should

be entertained by the complaints committee is a completely different tangent and

must be ascertained on the touchstone of whether it was filed at the earliest point

of time and whether the same has been mischievously filed at a belated stage to

cause prejudice to the person-charged. In the instant case, the Central Complaints

Committee was constituted on 06.08.2012 and its first hearing took place on

25.09.2012 whereas the second complaint had been filed by the complainant before

the Central Complaints Committee on 18.09.2012. Thus, the second complaint had

been promptly preferred right after the Central Complaints Committee was

constituted and duly before its first hearing.

50. The High Court’s reasoning that as the Central Complaints Committee was

constituted on the basis of the first complaint, its scope of inquiry was restricted to

its content, is completely erroneous inasmuch as the Central Complaints

Committee owed its existence to the 2006 Standing Order and not to the complaint.

Moreover, even if it is assumed for a moment that the complaints committee owed

its existence to the complaint, Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order envisages

filing of a complaint to the complaints committee i.e., it envisages a situation where

after a complaints committee had come into existence, a complaint may be

preferred to it.

Page 67 of 104

of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh reported in (1977) 2 SCC 491, wherein

the Court held that all material that are logically probative to a prudent mind ought

to be permissible in disciplinary proceedings keeping in mind the principles of fair

play. The relevant observations are reproduced below: -

52. In view of this unequivocal and clear proposition of law set out in Rattan

Singh (supra), it could be said that there was no legal bar on the Central Complaints

Committee to look into the allegations levelled in the second complaint dated 18.

09.2012. Since strict and technical rule of evidence and procedure does not apply

to departmental enquiry the connotation “evidence” cannot be understood in a

narrow technical sense as to include only that evidence adduced in a regular court

of law when a person is examined as a witness by administering oath. There should

not be any allergy to “hearsay evidence” provided it has reasonable nexus and

credibility.

53. In our judgment, the correct principle of law is found in the following

observations of Diplock, J. in Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries

Commissioner, Ex parte Moore reported in (1965) 1 Q.B. 456.

“These technical rules of evidence, however, form no part of the
rules of natural justice. The requirement that a person exercising
quasi-judicial functions must base his decision on evidence means
no more than it must be based upon material which tends logically
to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue
to be determined, or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the
occurrence of some future event the occurrence of which would be
relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin or consult an
astrologer, but that he must take into account any material which,
as a matter of reason, has some probative value. If it is capable of
having any probative value, the weight to be attached to it is a
matter for the person to whom Parliament has entrusted the
responsibility of deciding the issue. The supervisory jurisdiction of
the High Court does not entitle it to usurp this responsibility and
to substitute its own view for his.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Page 69 of 104

54. From the above case law, it becomes clear that it is open to the adjudicating

authority to accept, rely and evaluate any evidence having probative value and

come to its own conclusion, keeping in mind judicial approach and objectivity,

exclusion of extraneous material and observance of the rule of natural justice and

fair play. In short, the essence of the doctrine is that fair opportunity should be

afforded to the delinquent at the enquiry and he should not be hit below the belt.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is indeed limited. The

High Court should not exercise appellate powers and substitute its findings for the

findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is no doubt true that if there is

“no evidence” or the decision is “so unreasonable that no reasonable man could

have ever come to it”, or the decision is “so outrageous” in its defiance of logic or

of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to

the question to be decided could have arrived at it “or that it is so absurd that one

is satisfied that the decision-maker must have taken leave of his senses”, it calls for

interference by a competent court of law.

55. As discussed before, this Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council

(supra) had held that in sensitive matters such as sexual harassment misconduct,

there is an obligation to look into the entire evidence of the complainant that

inspires confidence. What is discernible from the above is that in disciplinary

proceedings documents and materials such as evidence or pleadings be it statement

of defence or a complaint should be readily entertained by the courts and more so

Page 70 of 104
by the disciplinary inquiry authorities irrespective of whether they are later

actually relied or not in the ultimate decision making. Thus, it would be quite

preposterous to hold that the complainant was precluded from making the second

complaint before the Central Complaints Committee merely because she had

already made one complaint to the IG, Frontier Headquarters, Guwahati.

56. In the context of the second complaint, the only relevant aspect that requires

consideration is whether any serious prejudice was caused to the respondent. It is

not in dispute that the respondent was provided with the copy of the second

complaint. It is also not in dispute that the respondent was aware of the nature of

the allegations levelled in the second complaint. It is also not in dispute that ample

opportunity was given to the respondent to meet with the allegations levelled in the

second complaint. It is not as if the respondent was taken by surprise. In such

circumstances, this aspect of the matter should have been looked into by the High

Court on the anvil of the principle of “test of prejudice”.

i) Principle of “Test of Prejudice” in Service Jurisprudence

57. The “test of prejudice” is a well settled canon of law that may be applied

where any procedural impropriety or violation of rule of audi alteram is alleged.

3 SCC 364 held that the test is to ascertain whether the violation of such procedure

or process resulted in a prejudice being caused or a loss of fair hearing. The relevant

observations are reproduced below: -

Page 71 of 104

xxx xxx xxx

Page 72 of 104

xxx xxx xxx

33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above
discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and

Page 73 of 104
are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries
and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the
employee):

(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an
employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental
enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory
provisions governing such enquiries should not be set
aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should
enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a
substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in
character.

(2) A substantive provision has normally to be
complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of
substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not
be applicable in such a case.

(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision,
the position is this: procedural provisions are generally
meant for affording a reasonable and adequate
opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are,
generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of
any and every procedural provision cannot be said to
automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed.
Except cases falling under — “no notice”, “no
opportunity” and “no hearing” categories, the complaint
of violation of procedural provision should be examined
from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such
violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee
in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found
that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to
be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including
setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment.
If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it
is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection,
it may be remembered that there may be certain
procedural provisions which are of a fundamental
character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice.

The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such
cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a
case where there is a provision expressly providing that
after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the

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employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in
his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does
not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent
officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-
evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for
in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e.,
whether the person has received a fair hearing
considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be
looked at from the point of view of directory and
mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle
stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of
looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not
a different or distinct principle.

(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of
a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to
be examined from the standpoint of substantial
compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation
of such a provision can be set aside only where such
violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent
employee.

(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision,
which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained
whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the
person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is
found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the
delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either
expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived
it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the
ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is
found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived
it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then
the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions
(include the setting aside of the order of punishment),
keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution
Bench in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC
(LS) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] . The ultimate test is
always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair
hearing, as it may be called.

(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any
rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only

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obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice —
or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be
implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action
— the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction
between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi
alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule,
as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words,
a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” and
no adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no notice”/“no
hearing” and “no fair hearing”. (a) In the case of former,
the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may
call it ‘void’ or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases,
normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take
proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance
with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the
latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of
audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the
standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or
Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the
circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did
not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall
depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear
that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule
against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down
elsewhere.]

(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the
primary principle of natural justice) the
Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the
ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule,
viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no
failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide
them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise
before them.

(7) There may be situations where the interests of State
or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of
audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may
have to balance public/State interest with the requirement
of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.”
(Emphasis supplied)

Page 76 of 104

(2001) 6 SCC 392, this Court further expanded the applicability of the “Test of

Prejudice” to even procedural provisions which are fundamental in nature with the

following relevant observations being reproduced below: -

“13. The matter may be examined from another viewpoint. There
may be cases where there are infractions of statutory provisions,
rules and regulations. Can it be said that every such infraction
would make the consequent action void and/or invalid? The statute
may contain certain substantive provisions, e.g., who is the
competent authority to impose a particular punishment on a
particular employee. Such provision must be strictly complied with
as in these cases the theory of substantial compliance may not be
available. For example, where a rule specifically provides that the
delinquent officer shall be given an opportunity to produce
evidence in support of his case after the close of the evidence of
the other side and if no such opportunity is given, it would not be
possible to say that the enquiry was not vitiated. But in respect of
many procedural provisions, it would be possible to apply the
theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice, as the
case may be. Even amongst procedural provisions, there may be
some provisions of a fundamental nature which have to be
complied with and in whose case the theory of substantial
compliance may not be available, but the question of prejudice
may be material. In respect of procedural provisions other than of
a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would
be available and in such cases objections on this score have to be
judged on the touchstone of prejudice. The test would be, whether
the delinquent officer had or did not have a fair hearing. …”
(Emphasis supplied)

59. We now proceed to consider the next question whether the respondent was

asked by the Central Complaints Committee whether he pleaded guilty to the

allegations levelled in the second complaint. The High Court after referring to the

Central Complaints Committee’s report found that, while the respondent was asked

whether he pleaded guilty to the allegations made in the first complaint, there was

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nothing to indicate that the same exercise had been undertaken in respect of the

second complaint.

60. In the aforesaid context, we must look into Rule 14 sub-rule (9) of the 1965

CCS Rules. The said provision reads as under: -

“14. Procedure for imposing major penalties.
(9) If the Government servant who has not admitted any of the
articles of charge in his written statement of defence or has not
submitted any written statement of defence, appears before the
inquiring authority, such authority shall ask him whether he is
guilty or has any defence to make and if he pleads guilty to any of
the articles of charge, the inquiring authority shall record the
plea, sign the record and obtain the signature of the Government
servant thereon.”

61. The obligation on the part of the Authority to ask the delinquent whether he

pleaded guilty or had any defence to make is only in the circumstances, if the

delinquent had not admitted any of the articles of charge in his written statement

of defence or had not submitted any written statement of defence. Indisputably, in

the case on hand, the respondent had filed his written statement of defence dealing

with all allegations on the ten points framed for determination that were enquired

into by the Committee and also cross-examined all the witnesses on the same.

62. In our opinion, mere violation of Rule 14(9) of the 1965 CCS Rules would

not vitiate the entire inquiry. Rule 14(9) is only procedural.

63. A similar view has been recently taken in Aureliano Fernandes (supra)

wherein this Court rejected the delinquent’s contention of prejudice, on the ground

that all materials proposed to be used against him were duly furnished and that he

Page 78 of 104
had submitted his reply to the same as-well. The relevant observations are

reproduced below: -

“64.… but it is not in dispute that all the complaints received
from time to time and the depositions of the complainants were
disclosed to the appellant. He was, therefore, well aware of the
nature of allegations levelled against him. Not only was the
material proposed to be used against him during the inquiry
furnished to him, he was also called upon to explain the said
material by submitting his reply and furnishing a list of
witnesses, which he did. Furthermore, on perusing the Report
submitted by the Committee, it transpires that depositions of
some of the complainants were recorded audio-visually by the
Committee, wherever consent was given and the appellant was
duly afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses
including the complainants. The charges levelled by all the
complainants were of sexual harassment by the appellant with a
narration of specific instances. Therefore, in the given facts and
circumstances, non-framing of the Articles of Charge by the
Committee cannot be treated as fatal. Nor can the appellant be
heard to state that he was completely in the dark as to the nature
of the allegations levelled against him and was not in a position
to respond appropriately.”
(Emphasis supplied)

and Others v. B. Karunakar and Others reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 held that

in order to determine if prejudice had been caused by a violation of a procedural

rule or facet of natural justice, it must be shown that violation had some bearing

either upon the outcome or the punishment imposed. The relevant observations are

as under:

“30.[v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on
the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is
not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to
him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to
the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or
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removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the
report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of
the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it
may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded
to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-
wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical
ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of
natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to
assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not
incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and
sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to
the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report,
has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no
different consequence would have followed, it would be a
perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to
get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the
dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of
justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an
"unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is
antithetical to justice.

31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not
furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary
proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of
the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not
already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give
the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was
prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing
the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the
non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the
ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal
should not interfere with the order of punishment. The
Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of
punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present. …”
(Emphasis supplied)

65. Applying the aforesaid dictum as laid by this Court no prejudice could be

said to have been caused to the respondent even if we believe that he was not asked

to plead guilty to the second complaint. Had the respondent been asked if he

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pleaded guilty to the allegations levelled in the second complaint, then in such

circumstances, whether the result would have been any different? The answer to

this has to be an emphatic “No”. We say so because the respondent had denied all

the ten charges which were framed against him. In other words, the respondent

answered to all the ten points by way of his written statement of defence and even

had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on each of the charges.

66. We are of the view that the High Court completely failed to advert itself to

the principles laid down by this Court as aforesaid, and mechanically proceeded to

set-aside the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on the

ground that there was nothing to indicate that the respondent was asked whether

he pleaded guilty to the charges imputed in the second complaint without applying

the principle of “test of prejudice”.

E.3 Whether the Central Complaints Committee could have put questions
to the witnesses in a departmental inquiry?

i) “Fact Finding” Authority in Disciplinary Proceedings

67. The High Court observed that the Central Complaints Committee in the

course of the inquiry had put questions to the prosecution witnesses, and even the

examination-in-chief was recorded by it, and as such it played the role of a

prosecutor which it could not have, thereby vitiating the inquiry proceedings.

68. Ordinarily, in a disciplinary proceeding conducted under Rule 14 of the 1965

CCS Rules, the disciplinary authority as per Rule 14 sub-rule 2 read with sub-rule

5(c) may either conduct the inquiry itself or appoint an inquiry committee to

Page 81 of 104
conduct the inquiry. The inquiry committee may further appoint a presenting

officer to present the case on its behalf in support of the articles of charge. It is

worthwhile to note that it is the Inquiry Authority and the Disciplinary Authority

who are the fact finding authorities in a disciplinary proceeding. Rule 14 is

reproduced below:

xxx xxx xxx
(5)(c) Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any
article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding
an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a
Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as the
"Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support
of the articles of charge.”

69. A perusal of the aforesaid makes it clear that, where a ‘Presenting Officer’

has been appointed by the Disciplinary Authority, such Officer shall present the

case in support of the articles of charge. Conversely, what logically transpires from

the aforesaid is that, where no presenting officer has been appointed, the duty or

role to present the case in support of the articles of charge falls back on the

Disciplinary Authority or the Inquiry Authority as the case may be.

reported in (2013) 1 SCC 311, held that the complaints committee under the

Page 82 of 104
Vishaka Guidelines shall be deemed to be the Inquiry Authority. The relevant

portion is reproduced below: -

“Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme Court in
its judgment in Vishaka case (1997) 6 SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
932, SCC at p. 253, will be deemed to be an inquiry authority for
the purposes of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964
(hereinafter call the CCS Rules) and the report of the Complaints
Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry report under the
CCS Rules. Thereafter the disciplinary authority will act on the
report in accordance with the Rules."

(Emphasis supplied)

The relevant observations are reproduced below: -

xxx xxx xxx

“34. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of with the
following directions:

(2) In holding trial of child sex abuse or rape:

(i) a screen or some such arrangements may be made where
the victim or witnesses (who may be equally vulnerable like
the victim) do not see the body or face of the accused;

(ii) the questions put in cross-examination on behalf of the
accused, insofar as they relate directly to the incident,
should be given in writing to the presiding officer of the
court who may put them to the victim or witnesses in a
language which is clear and is not embarrassing;

(iii) the victim of child abuse or rape, while giving testimony
in court, should be allowed sufficient breaks as and when
required.”
(Emphasis supplied)

72. The power and discretion of the complaints committee to put question to the

witnesses is further reflected though implicitly in Clause 10(viii) of the 2006

Standing Order which provides that, the delinquent officer shall not cross-examine
Page 84 of 104
the complainant directly and instead should hand over the questions to the

chairperson of the committee who in turn would then put them to the complainant,

to ensure no fear or embarrassment is caused to the complainant. The provision

reads as under:

“10. COMPLAINT MECHANISM

73. There appears to be neither any statutory bar nor any logic to restrict the

power of the complaints committee to put questions to the witnesses only to the

context enumerated in the aforesaid provision. The complaints committee being an

inquiry authority and in some sense equivalent to a presiding officer of the court

as inferred from Sakshi (supra), must be allowed to put questions on its own if a

proper, fair and thorough inquiry is to take place.

74. If the observations of the High Court are accepted, it would lead to a chilling

effect, whereby the complaints committee which is deemed to be an inquiry

authority would be reduced to a mere recording machine.

Page 85 of 104

75. We fail to understand what other purpose the complaints committee which

is deemed to be an ‘inquiry authority’ would serve, if we are to hold that the

complaints committee cannot put questions to the witnesses.

76. Even otherwise, the aforesaid issue has been answered by this Court in

very same argument was canvassed before a three-Judge Bench that the Inquiry

Officer could not have put his own questions to the prosecution witnesses and could

also have not cross-examined the witnesses. In the said case, it was argued that the

same would amount to making the prosecutor the judge. This argument was

negatived by the Court observing in para 31 as under:

questions to the parties or to the witnesses in order to discover or obtain proper

proof of relevant facts and this provision being widely used by the judges

throughout the country, we fail to understand as to how the complaints committee

after being equated with a judge in a judicial proceeding be denied that privilege.

However, it would be a different situation if a specific case of personal bias is made

out against the members of the committee. After all, the very purpose of the

disciplinary proceedings is to reach to the bottom of the fact while affording

adequate opportunities to the affected party.

78. Thus, the High Court was not correct in taking the view that the proceedings

stood vitiated because the Central Complaints Committee put questions to the

prosecution witnesses.

E.4 Whether the Central Complaints Committee based its findings on
conjectures and surmises? Whether the case on hand is one of
“no evidence”?

i) Principle of “No Evidence” in Service Jurisprudence

79. It is well settled that the findings of fact recorded in the course of any

domestic inquiry, unless they are collateral or jurisdictional, are exempt from

judicial review and that the court exercising writ jurisdiction should not sit in

appeal over the ultimate decision based on such findings and review it on merits.

However, there are two well-known exceptions to the said rule. First, the case must

not be one where there is “no evidence” to support the findings. Secondly, the

ultimate decision based on such findings must not be perverse or unreasonable.

Page 87 of 104

These two concepts have affinity with each other; indeed, the “no evidence”

principle clearly has something in common with the principle that perverse or

unreasonable action is unauthorised and ultra vires. As pointed out by Lord

Radcliffe in Edward (Inspector of Taxes, Bairstow. (1956) Appeal Cases, 14 at

page 36 “I do not think that it much matters whether this state of affairs is described

as one in which there is no evidence to support the determination or as one in

which the evidence is inconsistent with and contradictory of the determination, or

as one in which the true and only reasonable conclusion contradicts the

determination.” Rightly understood, each phrase propounds the same test, in each

of these cases, according to Lord Radcliffe, there would be an error in point of law

requiring the court's intervention.

80. We must explain the true meaning of the ‘no evidence’ principle. The rule

has been adopted in India from England and we may, therefore, ascertain, in the

first instance, how the rule over there is understood. Prof. H.W.R. Wade in his

treatise on Administrative Law, Fourth Edition, has observed as follows:

“It is one thing to weigh conflicting evidence which might justify
a conclusion either way. It is another thing altogether to make
insupportable findings. This is an abuse of power and may
cause grave injustice. At this point, therefore, the court is
disposed to intervene.

‘No evidence’ does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It
extends to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not
reasonably capable of supporting the finding; or where, in other
words, no tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on
that evidence.

There is, indeed, the well-established rule that to find facts on no
evidence is to err in law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Page 88 of 104

81. The learned Author has pointed out that the “no evidence” rule has some

affinity with the substantial evidence rule of American law which, as explained by

Bernard Schwartz in his treatise on Administrative Law, 1976 Edition, at page 595,

means “such evidence as might lead a reasonable person to make finding.” In other

words, according to the learned Author, “The evidence in support of a fact-finding

is substantial when from it an inference of existence of the fact may be drawn

reasonably.”

82. The earliest English decision which has touched upon the concept of “no

evidence” is that of the Court of Appeal in The King v. Carson Roberts reported

in 1908 (1) K.B., 407. The question in that case was whether the superior court

having the power to issue a writ of certiorari, if it appeared to it that the decision

Act, 1875, was erroneous, could review the same only when such decision was

erroneous in point of law and not when the auditor had come to an erroneous

conclusion in fact. Fletcher Moulton L.J. observed in that case as follows:

“It is admitted by the appellant that if there was no evidence on
which any tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion to
which the auditor has come the superior Courts have a
jurisdiction to quash the surcharge, and in my opinion this is the
case here."

83. In the Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner (supra), two learned law

Lords have made certain observations on the true content of the “no evidence” rule

Page 89 of 104
by treating the said rule as a principle of natural justice. Willmar L.J. observed as

under:

“Where so much is left to the discretion of the Commissioner,
the only real limitation, as I see it, is that the procedure must be
in accordance with natural justice. This involves that any
information on which the Commissioner acts, whatever its
source, must be at least of some probative value.”

84. Diplock L.J. made the following pertinent observations reproduced below:

“Where, as in the present case, a personal bias or mala
fides on the part of the deputy commissioner is not in
question, the rules of natural justice which he must observe
can, in my view, be reduced to two. First, he must base
decision on evidence, whether a hearing is requested or not.
Secondly, if a hearing is requested, he must fairly listen to the
contentions of all persons who are entitled to be represented
at the hearing.

“In the context of the first rule, “evidence” is not restricted
to evidence which would be admissible in a court of law….

“… The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial
functions must base his decision on evidence means no more
than it must be based upon material which tends logically to
show the existence or none-existence of facts relevant to the
issue to be determined, or to show the likelihood or
unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future event the
occurrence of which would be relevant. It means that he must
not spin a coin or consult an astrologer, but he may take into
account any material which, as a matter of reason, has some
probative value in the sense mentioned above. If it is capable
of having any probative value, the weight to be attached to it
is a matter for the person to whom Parliament has entrusted
the responsibility of deciding the issue. The supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court does not entitle it to usurp this
responsibility and to substitute its own view for his.””

Page 90 of 104

85. In French Kier Developments Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the

Environment reported in 1977 (1) All ELR 297, the jurisdiction of the court of

Queen’s Bench Division was invoked for quashing the appellate decision of the

Secretary of State confirming the refusal of permission for development. The

Secretary of State accepted the findings of fact recorded by the Inspector at the

conclusion of the public inquiry which followed the Borough Council's refusal of

permission but not his recommendation that the appeal should be allowed. The

Secretary of State, in deciding the appeal, took into consideration the contents of a

document and accepted them as correct, notwithstanding the fact that the Inspector

had regarded the document as of no evidential value. The argument before Willis

J. was that the Secretary of State should have ignored the document, or any

reference to its contents, as the Inspector did, since it was not produced by any

witness, its provenance was unexplained and it could not be tested by cross-

examination. The learned Judge made the following observations while

considering the submission:

“It hardly needs to be said that legal rules of evidence are not
applied at local inquiries, and both oral and documentary
evidence is freely admitted in circumstances where even the more
relaxed rules of evidence at the present time would not allow of its
admission in a court of law. Nonetheless some limit must surely be
imposed in fairness to an appellant on the scope of so-called
evidence which by no stretch of the imagination can be said to have
the slightest evidential value. This must, I should have thought,
particularly be so when if such ‘evidence’ is considered, it is used
to support a conclusion unfavourable to the appellant. I think the
Inspector was light to ignore this document and the Secretary of
State was wrong in the particular circumstances to attach any
weight to it or its contents.”

Page 91 of 104

86. The aforesaid decisions would indicate that the English Courts have not

construed the words “no evidence” narrowly. The rule of “no evidence” is there

attracted not only in cases where there is complete lack of evidence, that is to say,

where there is not a shred of evidence, but also in cases where the evidence, if any,

is not capable of having any probative value, or on the basis of which no Tribunal

could reasonably and logically come to the conclusion about the existence or non-

existence of facts relevant to the determination. According to the English decisions,

although a domestic tribunal may act on evidence not admissible according to the

legal rules in a court of law, yet unless such evidence has some probative value in

the sense mentioned above, it would be a breach of natural justice and/or an error

of law to base any adverse decision thereon.

AIR 1963 SC 1723, it was held at page 1726 that in considering whether a public

officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him the rule followed in criminal

trials with regard to the establishment of charge by evidence beyond reasonable

a court of appeal over the decision of the domestic tribunal, was concerned to

determine whether the inquiry was held by an authority competent in that behalf

and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of

natural justice were not violated. Then follow the following important

observations: -

Page 92 of 104

88. This decision was approvingly referred to and relied upon in State of

Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Chitra Venkata Rao reported in (1975) 2 SCC

557.

consideration in the context of the disciplinary proceedings against Government

enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order

of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all” and that there was little

doubt that a writ of Certiorari can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to

satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said

proceeding is based on no evidence. A conclusion on a question of fact, it was held,

would be assailable if it is manifest that there is no evidence to support it even

assuming bona fides of the disciplinary authority. The following observations

made at page 369 are material from the point of view of the aspect under

consideration:

Page 93 of 104

and Another reported in (2013) 14 SCC 379, this Court laid down the scope of

judicial review as regards the findings of the disciplinary proceedings with the

following relevant observations being reproduced below: -

“11. ... The scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge
to the disciplinary action taken by the employers is very limited.
The courts are primarily concerned with the question whether the
enquiry has been held by the competent authority in accordance
with the prescribed procedure and whether the rules of natural
justice have been followed. The court can also consider whether
there was some tangible evidence for proving the charge against
the delinquent and such evidence reasonably supports the
conclusions recorded by the competent authority. If the court
comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was held in consonance
with the prescribed procedure and the rules of natural justice and
the conclusion recorded by the disciplinary authority is supported
by some tangible evidence, then there is no scope for interference
with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority to
impose the particular punishment except when the same is found
to be wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved or
shocks the conscience of the court.”
(Emphasis supplied)

Page 94 of 104

91. This Court in Aureliano Fernandes (supra) while discussing upon the extent

to which a court can interfere with respect to the departmental proceedings

conducted pursuant to the allegations of sexual harassment, made the following

relevant observations: -

“62. … Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts and once
findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded,
the High Court in its writ jurisdiction should not normally
interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the
recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the
findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The
Court is under a duty to satisfy itself that an inquiry into the
allegations of sexual harassment by a Committee is conducted in
terms of the service rules and that the concerned employee gets
a reasonable opportunity to vindicate his position and establish
his innocence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

ii) Standard of Proof in Disciplinary Proceedings

92. In another decision of this Court in West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v.

Ram Pravesh Singh reported in (2008) 3 SCC 729, it was held that in a

departmental inquiry, the standard of proof is based on preponderance of

probability and not beyond reasonable doubt. The relevant observation made in it

are given below: -

“20. The Tribunal has set aside the report of the enquiry officer
and the order of dismissal passed by the punishing authority by
observing that the charges against the respondent were not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It has repeatedly been held by
this Court that the acquittal in a criminal case would not operate
as a bar for drawing up of a disciplinary proceeding against a
delinquent. It is well-settled principle of law that yardstick and
standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the one in
disciplinary proceedings. While the standard of proof in a

Page 95 of 104
criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard
of proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of
probabilities.”
(Emphasis supplied)

93. Similarly in Apparel Export (supra) this Court had held that inquiries in

respect of sexual harassment must be examined on broader probabilities keeping

in mind the entire background of the case. Thus, in a disciplinary inquiry, the

standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities and the courts must only

interfere where the findings are either perverse or based on no evidence at all.

94. Bearing the aforesaid principles of law in mind, we must look into some

relevant portion of the evidence taken into consideration by the Central Complaints

Committee for arriving at the conclusion that the charges are held to be proved: -

a. Shri Mast Ram Thakur, SFA(H) (PW3) stated that the respondent used to

quite often call the complainant in his chamber and made her sit for hours

without any office work. He further stated that quite often on such occasions,

the respondent would draw the curtains of his chamber. He also stated that

the complainant had once conveyed to him that the respondent used to make

proposals of marriage to her.

Nothing substantial could be elicited from the cross-examination of Mast

Ram Thakur. In fact, what has been deposed by Mast Ram Thakur as

referred above, has not even been remotely disputed in the cross-

examination by way of even a suggestion.

b. Shri Rynjan Singh, peon (PW8) and Shri Chandan Sarkar (PW6) stated that

they had seen the complainant being made to sit in the respondent’s chamber
Page 96 of 104
for hours. Shri Ashok Kumar, PA (PW17) further stated that the complainant

had once told him that after being called in his chamber the respondent

would often comment on her beauty and clothes.

c. Shri P.K. Rawat, UDC (PW5), Shri Ranjit Patoi, Assistant (PW7) and Shri

Samir Nandi, SFA(G) (PW14) have all stated that they had seen the

respondent pour himself a glass of water in his chamber and then go to the

complaint’s room 5-6 times a day, and while drinking he would always be

looking at the complainant. Shri Runjan Singh, peon (PW8) stated that

earlier the respondent used to drink water in his own chamber, but once the

complainant joined the office, he started frequently visiting her room to

drink water.

d. Shri Rabi Ram Biswas, sweeper (PW12) stated that he had seen the

respondent touching the shoulder of the complaint while teaching her to

operate a laptop. Smt Pema Narzary, AFO(WI) (PW9) stated that the

complainant had once told her how the respondent used to call her to his

chamber on the pretext of teaching her to operate the laptop. Shri Rynjan

Singh, peon (PW8) stated that on one occasion, the respondent shut the door

of his Chamber while teaching the complainant and when all of a sudden he

entered the respondent’s chamber the respondent got startled and moved

away from the complainant and instructed him to knock before entering.

e. Shri Rabi Ram Biswas, peon (PW12) stated that whenever, the complainant

would leave the office, the respondent would also leave soon thereafter in a

Page 97 of 104
hurry. The other staff presumed that this hurry was due to the respondent’s

desire to drive the complainant home. Shri Rynjan Singh, peon (PW8) stated

that he had seen the respondent offering a lift to the complainant and that it

was only the complainant to whom the respondent used to offer. Smt. Pema

Narzary, AFO(WI) (PW9) stated to have heard from other office staff that

the respondent would offer lifts to the complainant in his official vehicle.

f. Shri B.B. Sonar, chowkidar (PW4) stated that once while the complainant

was standing in the ladies’ queue for booking tickets at the railway station,

the respondent approached her from behind and placed his hand on her

shoulder. This made the complainant very uncomfortable and on shrugging

off her shoulder the respondent withdrew his hand. He further stated that he

saw the complainant looking upset and uncomfortable.

To the aforesaid allegations, the respondent offered his explanation

saying that he had done so as it was his “bounden duty to protect the dignity

of the complainant” from the “boisterous crowd” and also to make people

know standing at the railway station that the complainant was not alone.

g. Shri Mast Ram Thakur, SFA(H) stated that he overheard the respondent

making sexually coloured remarks to the complainant at the railway station

saying; “aap to jaa rehen hain, meri jaan jaa rahi hai. Aap chinta mat karo

main tumhara dimag taza karne ke iye bhej rahaa huu, vahaan se aane ke

baad tum shrimati paul banogi”.

Page 98 of 104

h. Shri B.B. Sonar, chowkidar (PW4), Shri A. Deben Singh, AFO(M) (PW13)

Shri Surjit Singh, Driver (PW2), Shri Rynjan Singh, peon (PW8) all stated

to have heard from the other office staff that the respondent would often visit

the complainant’s residence uninvited and make proposal of marriage. Other

witnesses namely; Shri Shyam Dass, Section Officer DACS (retd.) (PW19),

Shri Subhash Prasad, UDC (PW18), Shri Ashok Gahlot, PA (PW17), Shir

Jinen Singh, UDC (PW11), Shri Ranjit Patoi, Shri Samir Nandi, SFA(G) and

Smt. Pema Nazary, AFO(WI) (PW9) all supported these allegations and said

to have heard from the complainant sometime in 2009-10 that the respondent

used to visit her house at odd hours and also used to misbehave with her by

making sexual advances and asking the complainant to leave her husband

and marry him. Shri Chandan Sarkar, SFA(M) (PW6), stated to have even

heard a telephonic recording of the respondent making sexual remarks to the

complainant. Shri P.K. Rawat, UDC (PW5) stated that on many occasions

he had seen the respondent sitting at the complainant’s house.

i. Shri S.C. Katoch, IG (PW20), stated that the complainant had once

telephoned him making a complaint against the respondent for detaining her

beyond working hours. He further stated that, he had then telephonically

reprimanded the respondent after which the respondent assigned her no

work. Shri Mast Ram Thakur, SFA(H) (PW3) and Shri Ranjit Patoi, Assitant

(PW7) also corroborated the aforesaid and stated that the respondent

Page 99 of 104
withdrew all work from the complainant after she made a complaint against

him.

95. The aforesaid would indicate that this is not a case of “no evidence”. Some

evidence has come on record to indicate or rather substantiate the allegations of

sexual harassment levelled by the complainant. What is most important to note at

this stage is that the High Court has not gone into the sufficiency of evidence as it

was aware that the law does not permit it to go into the issue of sufficiency of

evidence for the purpose of holding a public servant guilty of the alleged

misconduct. It is in such circumstances that in the entire judgment the High Court

has concentrated only on technical pleas raised by the respondent. It is only on the

issue of point 7(a) that the High Court seems to have taken the view that the

findings in that regard are based on conjecture and surmises.

96. The High Court took the view that in respect of the allegations contained in

Point 7(a) which relates to the respondent making unsolicited phone calls to the

complainant, although no evidence of the call recordings had been produced to

substantiate the same, yet the Central Complaints Committee accepted the

allegations as true, and therefore its findings could be said to be based on

conjectures and surmises.

97. The aforesaid in our opinion is not correct. The allegation in Point 7(a) was

rightly accepted by the Central Complaints Committee keeping in mind the

background of the case. The Central Complaints Committed duly noted that the

non-availability of the call records was owed to the fact that the inquiry into the

Page 100 of 104
complainant’s grievances was undertaken after a lapse of significant time.

Moreover, the said finding is fortified by the oral evidence of one of the witnesses

who deposed that he was aware of the respondent making calls to the complainant.

The relevant portion is reproduced below: -

“POINT 7
“x. … Shri Samir Nandi has also stated that he knew that Shri
Dilip Paul was calling Smt. X on her mobile.

xxx xxx xxx
B. The Complaints Committee made every effort to substantiate
the charge that Shri Dilip Paul often telephoned Smt. X, and that
too at odd hours, but since call records for Shri Dilip Paul's
mobile phone were not available and Smt. X had a prepaid SIM
card, it has failed to do so.

xxx xxx xxx
... The Complaints Committee also notes that the unavailability
of corroboration from call records cannot be laid at Smt. X's door
because, had the enquiry into her complaint been timely and
speedy, these records would have been available as on date.””

98. Before we close this judgement, we must deal with one submission very

vociferously canvassed on behalf of the respondent as regards the multiple inquiries

conducted by the appellant. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the

normal rule is that there can be only one inquiry. It was also submitted that once

the on-spot / preliminary inquiry revealed nothing incriminating against the

delinquent, no further committee could have been constituted to inquire into the

allegations once again.

99. It was further submitted that even the Frontier Complaints Committee came

to the conclusion that the charges were not held to be proved.

Page 101 of 104

100. In such circumstances referred to above, according to the learned counsel,

the Central Complaints Committee could not have been constituted to probe further

into the allegations. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court

in the case of Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India reported in (2014) 10 SCC

589.

101. In the aforesaid context, we may only say that the aforesaid point was raised

even before the High Court and the same came to be negatived holding as under:

“22. The report dated 13.12.2011 was submitted pursuant to
conducting of an on-the-spot enquiry. On-the-spot enquiry, by
the very nature of it, is summary in nature. Such enquiry cannot
be equated with a disciplinary enquiry. It will be relevant to note
that before the report of the on-the-spot enquiry was submitted,
the competent authority had constituted FLCC, which had also
commenced its proceedings. In that context, even if in such an
on-the-spot enquiry, no allegation was found to have been
established, same would not have any material bearing in the
facts of the instant case. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was
posted at the frontier and, accordingly, in terms of the Standing
Order No. 1/06, FLCC was constituted to enquire into the
allegation of sexual harassment. As noticed earlier, though the
FLCC had submitted report on 17.01.2012, the same was
cancelled by Memorandum dated 10.12.2012 on the ground that
the Chairperson of the FLCC was not an officer who was senior
to the petitioner against whom the complaint was made.

23. We are unable to subscribe to the submission of the learned
counsel for the petitioner that report of FLCC could not have
been cancelled and the report was required to be acted upon as
the Chairperson of the FLCC being from a different stream, the
question of comparison of seniority did not arise. It is not the
contention of the petitioner that the Chairperson was, indeed,
higher in rank than the petitioner. Therefore, the significance of
appropriate constitution of the Complaints Committee, in terms
of the norms laid down, cannot be lost sight of. True, the
authorities themselves had constituted the Complaints
Committee, but the fact by itself cannot detract the competent
authority from cancelling the proceeding or the report of an

Page 102 of 104
improperly constituted committee. It was in this background the
CCC had come into the picture. Though earlier the FLCC had
conducted enquiry, we find that the CCC can also enquire into
any matter of sexual abuse in the organization which necessarily
includes the frontier also and, therefore, it cannot be said that
the CCC could not have exercised authority in the instant case.
The decision in K. D. Pandey (supra), wherein it was held that
when specific findings have been given in respect of charges by
the inquiry officer, the matter could not have been remitted to the
inquiring authority for further inquiry as it would have resulted
in a second inquiry and not a further inquiry on the same set of
charges and the materials on record, will not be applicable in the
facts and circumstances of the case. In K. R. Deb (supra), the
Supreme Court observed in the context of the rules in question
that though it may be possible in certain circumstances for the
disciplinary authority to record further evidence, because of
some serious defects that had crept into the inquiry or some
important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry
or were not examined for some other reason, no power is vested
in the disciplinary authority to completely set aside previous
inquiry on the ground that the report does not appeal to the
disciplinary authority. It was also observed that disciplinary
authority in terms of the rules had enough power to reconsider
the evidence and come to its own conclusion. In Vijay Shankar
Pandey (supra), the Supreme Court followed K.R. Deb (supra)
and reiterated the principle laid down therein. The said decisions
are also not applicable to the facts of the present case. We also
find no merit in the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner
that complaint dated 30.08.2011 having not been submitted to the
Complaints Committee, the same could not have been acted
upon. Materials on record do not indicate that at the time of
submission of the complaint dated 30.08.2011, there was any
specific Complaints Committee in place and on the contrary, it
appears that only after the complaint was received by the
authority, FLCC was constituted to go into the complaint. Even
otherwise, the Standing Order No.1/2006 itself visualizes
submission of complaint directly to the Frontier IG/IF under
certain circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)

102. We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid findings recorded by the

High Court on the issue of multiple inquiries.

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F. CONCLUSION

103. For all the forgoing reasons, we have reached to the conclusion that the

appeal deserves to be allowed. The High Court committed an egregious error in

passing the impugned judgment and order.

104. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court dated 15.05.2019 is hereby set-aside.

105. The order of penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is hereby

restored. However, we clarify that the appellant shall not effect any recovery of the

amount already paid so far to the respondent.

106. Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of.

…...……..….………….……………CJI.

(Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud)

…….…..….…….…..…………………J.

(J.B. Pardiwala)

…………...…...……………………….J.

(Manoj Misra)

New Delhi;

November 6, 2023.

Page 104 of 104